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ABSTRACT
Five diverse companies in the home building industry were studied
using an analytical framework taken from contemporary strategic planning
literature. Their strategic planning processes were analyzed to identify
the strategic determinants that contributed to the success of the
companies, and yielded a competitive advantage.
The results showed that the three successful companies had the
following characteristics: clear and articulated generic strategies;
clearly defined values and systematic use of analytical material to inform
the decision making process. The successful firms also addressed
strategic implementation issues. The results further showed that none of
the firms had a strategic planning staff; that all of the firms made
decisions based largely upon judgement of the principals and, successful
or not, were opportunistic and entrepreneurial; and that strategies based
upon local or national product differentiation or strategies focused by
buyer, product and/or local market were the most successful, possibly
because of the fragmented industry context in which the firms worked.
The thesis concluded that firms gain competitive advantage by
clarifying and articulating their generic strategies in order to position
themselves in the industry and with buyers; by clarifying values to
develop the more creative and unique products necessary for product
differentiation; and by informing the decision making process with
analysis and technical information. All of the firms used only an
informal and ad hoc strategic process; all blended learning, probing,
experimentation, analysis and the judgement to form strategies. A lack of
a formal planning process with a planning staff and a written strategic
plan did not prevent firms from forming successful business strategies.
The thesis also concluded that success in the home building industry takes
more than entrepreneurial talent - it takes a clear strategic perspective
and strategic discipline.
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Introduction
This paper examines the strategic decisions of five firms in the home
building industry in order to see which strategic factors contribute to
the success of the firms, and yield a competitive advantage.
The home building industry, for purposes of this paper, is defined as
all residential builders and developers in the United States who build or
remodel dwelling units that are permanently attached to the land.
According to the National Association of Home Builders (NAHB) the industry
specifically includes builders and developers of single family homes,
rental multifamily developers, condominium builders, contract home
builders who build on an owner's land, land developers, and residential
remodelers and rehabilitators. The NAHB excludes mobile home builders,
and commercial, industrial and institutional developers, builders,and
rehabilitators because their product is neither dwelling units nor a close
substitute for dwelling units.
The first chapter of the paper surveys the strategic planning
literature, starting with the core concepts of corporate strategy through
its early portfolio applications to the three parallel trends that have
emerged in the 1980s. These three trends are: the futurists, the
incrementalists and the competitive strategists. The chapter examines key
concepts of each trend in order to build a theoretical framework for the
case studies and analysis chapter.
The second chapter discusses some of the industry-wide problems which
companies face. This chapter is not an industry analysis and does not
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attempt to develop the industry information that firms should to consider
when making strategic decisions. (See Appendix A for more detail about
the components of an industry analysis.)
The third chapter presents five case studies of very diverse
companies. The companies range in size from a small builder with 15
starts a year to one of the 50 largest home building companies in the
country, with over 2000 starts a year. The case studies are based on a
person-to-person interview technique and cover the companies' histories;
their present situations; their organization and the values of the
principals; their decision making structures and strategic planning
processes; the generic strategies chosen; competitors; risk profiles; a
history of strategic decisions (entry into the industry or into new
products, vertical integration, capacity expansion, and the contemplated
exit decisions contemplated), and a summary of strategy. (The identities
of all of the companies are disguised.)
The fourth chapter presents the case study data in a summary matrix
which is analyzed through the theoretical lens developed in Chapter 1.
The analysis identifies the factors which distinguish the strategic
practices of the successful firms. The analysis specifically looks at
articulated generic strategies, clear values, strategic process, use of
technical data in decision making, and entrepreneurial talents.
The fifth and last chapter draws conclusions from the data and
proposes generalizations about the relative roles played by
entrepreneurship and strategy in successful firms in the industry.
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CHAPTER 1 - LITERATURE REVIEW AND ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK
Introduction
The first section of this chapter surveys the strategic
planning literature. It starts with the classical concepts of strategic
planning. It traces the discipline through its first applications in
diversified companies; examines the criticisms that emerged from the
early planning applications; and looks at three parallel trends that
have emerged in the 1980s in the discipline of strategic planning. The
three trends are broadly defined as the futurists, the strategic
incrementalists, and the competitive strategists.
The second section of the chapter examines concepts from each of
the current trends in detail to develop a theoretical framework for the
case studies and analytical chapters that follow.
3
Section 1 -A Review of the Strategic Planning Literature
a. The Classical Concept of Corporate Strategy
Strategic planning was only a forty-year-old discipline in 1987.
It emerged from two separate strains of thought: program planning
initiated by the Department of Defense in World War II, which gave birth
to the yearly budget; and an academic effort in the 1950s at Harvard
University to develop a separate discipline of overall corporate
strategy.
In the literature, the concept of corporate strategy applied to the
entire business enterprise. The corporate strategy of a company defined
the businesses in which a company competed, preferably in a way that
focused its resources and converted its distinct competencies into a
competitive advantage for the firm.
Corporate strategy was an organizational process in many ways
inseparable from the structure, behavior and culture of the company in
which it took place. The interdependence of purposes, policies and
organized action were seen as crucial to the pattern of strategic
decisions that formed the particularity of a firm's individual strategy.
Some aspects of this pattern remained unchanged over a long period of
time; for example, a decision to produce only high-quality,
differentiated products might form the core of the company's special
accomplishments. But, in response to changes in the corporate
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environment and in order to remain profitable, other aspects of strategy
had to change, like choices of product lines, production processes,
financial vehicles, and markets served (Andrews, 1987, p. 14).
The organizational process of corporate strategy was looked at in
terms of strategy formation and strategy implementation and in the early
literature strategy formulation was seen as a rational process.
As a logical activity, strategy formation focused on identifying
opportunities and threats in the company's environment; attaching some
estimate of risk to the alternatives; and making an appraisal of the
company's strengths and weaknesses and an assessment of the resources
available. The risk profile of the company depended in part upon the
company's profit objectives. These two elements constituted the
economic side of the strategic decision making.
Later, two other elements were brought into the strategic equation:
what the chief executive and his or her immediate associates wanted to
do (i.e., their personal values and preferences apart from financial
considerations), and what the company felt it should do to fulfill its
obligations to other segments of society. The elements of preferences
and values-constituted the non-economic side of strategic decision
making, and the planners were left to reconcile any divergence between
values and optimal economic strategy (Andrews, 1987).
Strategy implementation was seen as a series of subactivities that
were primarily administrative. It was important to examine these
activities to determine if the organization served the strategy chosen,
or the strategy was being subverted. Strategic implementation was
filtered through the company's organizational structure and
relationships, information systems, coordination of work, standards of
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measurement, motivation and incentive systems, control systems, and
recruitment and personnel development systems; it also was reflected in
the leadership role in the company.
Strategic management was management of the organizational process
of strategy formation within an organization, and was distinct from
decision making itself. The aim of strategic management was to develop
a process or framework that allowed the company to look from its present
situation into the future, while retaining unity in the corporate
effort. Strategic management involved recognizing and reconciling
uncertain environmental opportunity, clarifying corporate capabilities
and resources, recognizing submerged personal values and aspirations to
social responsibility, and moving the decision making process through
the organization.
Opportunism was seen as the principal counter force to strategic
management. It was a philosophy and practice that accepted opportunity
as the basis for management action, rather than a continuous process of
strategic decision making. Decisions from an opportunistic process were
characterized as either unplanned, intuitive, or a response to
environmental pressures, as opposed to disciplined decisions resulting
from a planning process.
A summary statement of strategy for a corporation included
decisions about product lines; services; markets or market segments;
channels through which markets were reached; means of financing; profit
objectives; level of risk and level of return sought; major policies for
important areas such as marketing, manufacturing, labor relations and
R&D; the intended size, form and climate of the company; the extent of
forward and backward integration chosen; and social contribution.
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Theorists were aware that it was always possible to.create an
apparent strategy from a summary of a company's past strategic
decisions, and were very interested in whether the strategy was the
result of a conscious planning process, or was the patterned result of
responses of individual executives to environmental pressures,
competitive threats, and entrepreneurial opportunity.
A business unit strategy was less comprehensive than corporate
strategy and defined the choice of product or service and market for the
individual businesses. A business unit strategy applied to both single
businesses and businesses within a larger firm. A business strategy was
a determination of how the company would compete and how it would
position itself among its competitors.
The concept of portfolio strategy was developed to assist the
diversified company in determing the businesses it would compete in; how
to allocate the parent's resources among the various businesses it
owned; and when to sell. Corporate strategies, business strategies and
portfolio strategies were all outcomes of the process of strategic
management.
Strategic decisions were described as decisions that were effective
over long periods of time, and which committed or refocused significant
portions of the company's resources. Strategic decisions were usually
not isolated decisions, but were part of the pattern of decisions that
defined the company's corporate strategy.
7
b. Early Contributions of the Portfolio Analysts
Strategic planning first took hold in large diversified companies.
Early planning efforts were primarily directed at the needs of top
managers of diversified companies and did not address the needs of
individual business unit managers.
Many consulting firms entered the strategic planning field in the
1970s to assist diversified companies in addressing the economic side of
the strategy formation. "In one way or another, their proposals were
all tools for portfolio planning based on the notion that a diversified
company could be likened to a portfolio of stocks" (Porter, 1987, p.
18).
Each consulting group seemed to stress a different aspect of
economic strategy as a basis for advise. Arthur D. Little (ADL) used
the life cycle as the key variable by which to gauge industry
attractiveness and competitive position. The Boston Consulting Group
(BCG) popularized the experience curve, which identified relative market
share as the primary variable. BCG promoted the cost-leadership
strategy for all companies based on a view that the company with the
largest volume would have a competitive advantage of lower-costs. BCG
also popularized the growth-share matrix; the annual market growth and
the relative market-share of each business unit in a portfolio was
positioned on the matrix. The basic premise of the growth-share matrix
was that growth and profitability were tightly linked. McKinsey &
Company developed the attractiveness-strength matrix to enumerate a
wider variety of critical success factors. McKinsey was the first of
the consulting companies to look at both industry attractiveness and
8
business (Hax and Majluf, 1984, Chapters 6-11).
The early planning techniques highlighted single aspects of
attractiveness or competition, gave dubious advice, and have been
discarded. Portfolio planning was also largely discredited when
diversified companies experienced widespread failure in acquisitions
made through application of portfolio theory, and divested in the early
1980s. However, the consulting groups made an important contribution to
our understanding of the economic side of strategic planning. The
concepts of the experience curve and cost-leadership have survived.
McKinsey's concepts of industry attractiveness, business strengths, and
competitor analysis (when applied to business units instead of
portfolios) became the economic strategic planning concepts of the
1980s.
c. Criticisms of the Strategic Planning Process
In the 1970s, strategic planning was a "fad." Many businesses
adopted a formal planning process and installed a strategic planning
department. Strategic management was often divided between top
management, whose role was limited to issuing planning guidelines which
specified goals to be met and information required in plans, and the
planners, who gathered information and produced thick planning books
complete with five years of financial projections. This very formal
conception of the strategic planning process quickly became bureaucratic
and often did not work. The strategic plans were easily ignored or
sabotaged, and often were not implemented. Despite the major
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commitments of time, and a substanitial investment of finances for
planning staffs, strategic thinking seemed to get lost in the
process.
These early planning process failures created a great deal of
dissatisfaction with strategic planning. Many strategic planning
departments were dismantled, often with a great deal of glee. In the
early 1980s, it was fashionable to see the strategic planning process as
the source of industries' troubles (Porter, 1987). Other determinants
of corporate success replaced strategic planning as the "newest fads."
They included corporate culture (Schwartz and Davis, 1981),
entrepreneurism (Stevenson and Gumpert, 1983) and Japanese management
techniques (Kotler, Fahey and Jatusripitak, 1985).
A trend began emerging in the literature as early as the 1960s that
reflected industry criticisms of the formal planning processes. Several
authors conducted studies among successful managers to look more closely
at how they actually made decisions. As early as 1967, Edward Wrapp, in
his classic article, "Good Managers Don't Make Policy Decisions," argued
forcefully that the formal planning model did not describe the process
by which decisions were actually made. His research lead him to
describe successful managers as opportunists who "muddled-through" the
strategic decision making process, borrowing bits and pieces of master
plans without becoming personally committed to an articulated strategy
in an effort to get parts of their own plans implemented (Wrapp, 1967).
Henry Mintzberg also tried to explained why effective managers
seemed to revel in ambiguity and why analytical planning techniques had
so little success at the policy level. In his 1976 article, "Planning
on the Left Side and Managing on the Right," Mintzberg utilized
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scientific discoveries about the logical, linear, sequential
capabilities of the left-brain, and the more holistic, intuitive and
relational information processing capabilities of the right-brain. He
hypothesized that the important policy processes of managing an
organization relied to a considerable extent on the facilities
identified with the right brain. With his left-brain right-brain
analogy, Mintzberg explained the reliance by top managers on verbal
information, intuition, and judgement, and described their decision
making process as more intuitive and discontinuous than planned, linear
and sequential. Mintzberg said that strategic planning was not the best
approach to policy formation, which was an intuitive, rather than
intellectual, activity. But he did not dismiss the need for good
analytical input into policy decisions. He saw a firmly established
role for analytic ability at the operating and middle levels of most
organizations (Mintzberg, 1976).
Other authors described the consensus building that managers
engage in to implement decisions. "Successful managers didn't rely on
the brilliance of a strategic plan to win organizations into responding,
but rather act logically and incrementally to improve the quality of
information that went into key decisions; actively worked to overcome
the personal and political pressures resisting change in their
organizations; deal with the varying lead times and sequencing problems
in critical decisions; and build their organizations' awareness,
understanding, and psychological commitment necessary to effective
strategies" (Quinn, 1980, p. 39).
Research was also conducted on the role of values and preferences
of key managers in strategic decisions. The premise that there was
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purely economic strategy, uncontaminated by the personality and goals of
the decision maker, of the persons closest to him or her, and the
employees who had to carry out the strategy, was challenged by Alan W.
Rowe in "the Myth of the Rational Decision Maker." Rowe concluded that
preference was inevitable. In any complex decision where personal or
behavioral factors apply, the individuals' preferences would dominate
the results, with a single factor usually forming the basis for a
personal preference decision and an analysis developed around the
decision to support the preference. Rowe took the position that one
needed to understand and accept the role of preference to understand
business decisions. The desirable side of preference was that it built
the commitment of the executive and others for the chosen strategy
(Rowe, 1974).
The work of Wrapp, Quinn, Mintzberg, Rowe and other early
incrementalists made a substantial contribution to the strategic
planning field by valuing the actual experiences of managers, and
attempting to theoretically explain those experiences. Their work
recognized that the key managerial processes were enormously complex and
had to be described in terms of judgement and preference, as well as
analysis, and modeled in a non-linear (not sequential) fashion.
d. Strategic Planning in the 1980s
Three separate trends in strategic planning emerged in the 1980s.
The Competitive Strategists built upon the more rational and analytical
tradition of classical strategic planning theory and the analysis of
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economic strategies begun by the portfolio theorists. The competitive
strategists, resisting a growing industry response to reduce strategic
planning to yearly discussions of major issues, emphasized the need to
engage in a formal planning process that combined strategic thinking and
strategic implementation. While strategic plans were still recommended
for every business unit, the new emphasis was on training line managers
to think strategically; on industry-specific analysis using
environmental trends to help forecast industry changes and
opportunities; and on articulating the specific strategy being followed
by a company in order to analyze whether in fact it is delivering a
competitive advantage for the company in its industry.
The Futurists came from a more off-beat tradition that had some of
its origins in the planning efforts for the Apollo space missions. As
consultants, the futurists assisted businesses in developing creative
and integrative strategies by conceptualizing a vision of what they
would like the future to be like. They concentrated on clarifying
values as a prelude to strategic planning processes, and scanned a wider
range of environmental information than the competitive strategists in
order to gain a breath of images of potential futures. In the futurists
theory, clarifying values allowed for advantage by helping companies to
be proactive (not reactive) to changing environments.
The third trend, Strategic Incrementalist, evolved out of the work
of Wrapp and Mintzberg, and a group of researchers at McGill University.
They synthesized the rational and experiential aspects of strategy
formation by valuing both deliberate and emergent strategies. Mintzberg
argued that only acknowledging a deliberative model and denying that
strategies form and emerge in response to evolving situations, distorted
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the connection between action and learning. Mintzberg argued that the
metaphor of crafting strategy helped clarify the actual strategic
process and was a more appropriate model of how strategy was formed.
"Crafting" explained the connection between the decision maker's
involvement, experience and mastery of detail, and his or her ability to
know the capabilities of the organization deeply enough to able to
intuitively know and rationally express what direction to take an
organization (Mintzberg, 1987).
All three of the schools of thought seemed to be developing
independently of each other.
Outside the continuum of strategic theorists a school of critics
was emerging who saw no competitiv'e advantage in clarifying economic
strategy, clarifying values or better understanding the strategic
process. This group saw "hustle as strategy", and "doing things well"
as providing businesses with competitive advantage. Strategy and
strategic thinking were discarded entirely in favor of entrepreneurial
pursuit of opportunity (Bhide, 1986).
Section 2 - Analytical Framework
This section of the paper examines in greater depth the concepts
developed by the futurists, the strategic incrementalists and the
competitive strategists. It borrows concepts from each school of
thought in order to develop a conceptual framework for the case studies
in Chapter 2, and is later used as the theoretical basis for analysis in
Chapter 3.
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a. The School of Competitive Strategy
Michael Porter lead the trend to focus strategic planning on
competitive strategy. Porter provided a practical but comprehensive
framework to help firms make sound economic strategic decisions. The
components of Porter's methodology were:
. industry analysis to determine industry
attractiveness to investors;
. analysis of the company's competitive position;
. analysis of current and potential competitors;
. identification of the sources of competitive
advantage and selection of a specific strategy
. specific actions to implement the strategy chosen
(Porter, 1980 and 1987).
(Porter's concept of industry analysis is discussed in more detail in
Appendix A.) What follows is a detailed discussion of the concepts that
will be relied upon in the case studies and the analysis sections of
this thesis. The concepts to be discussed are generic strategy,
competitive position, competitor analysis, and selection of strategy.
(Specific strategic decisions facing existent firms in industry are.
elaborated upon in Appendix B.)
Generic Strategies - Sources of Competitive Advantage
Porter identified three internally consistent generic strategies
which could be used singly or in combination to advantageously position
a firm in its industry. These strategies were: overall cost-leadership,
industry-wide differentiation, and focus. In order to choose a generic
strategy, a firm had to understand its competitive position, i.e., its
cost position, and who its buyers were and what they valued (Porter,
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1980, p. 34).
The overall cost leadership strategy aimed at achieving the
low-cost position in the industry through a set of functional policies
aimed at this basic objective. Low cost relative to competitors was the
advantage the firm used to achieve above-average returns by driving less
efficient competition from the field. This strategy depended upon a
high market share or the advantages of favorable access to raw
materials.
In a differentiation strategy the firm aimed at creating a product
or service that was perceived industry-wide as unique. Differentiation
did not allow the firm to ignore costs, but low-cost position was not
the primary target. Instead, differentiation was aimed at lowering the
buyer's sensitivity to price, and at increasing profit margins in order
to reduce the power of suppliers. Achieving differentiation sometimes
precluded gaining high market-share.
The focus strategy required concentration on a particular buyer
group, segment of product line or geographic market, rather than
penetrating the entire industry. The focused firm aimed to serve a
particular target very well, and each functional policy was developed
with that goal in mind. The strategy rested on the assumption that the
firm would able to serve its narrow target more effectively or
efficiently than competitors who were competing more broadly. The aim
of focusing could be achieving low-costs for the narrow market segment
chosen, or differentiation, or both. Again the focus strategy traded
market-share or sales volume for profitability.
A firm that failed to develop in one of these directions was stuck
in the middle. It would be at a competitive disadvantage because it
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would not be able to compete for the price-sensitive customer without
bidding away its profits, and it would lack the differentiation
necessary to win the high-margin business.
Competitor Analysis
Competitor analysis was a component of strategy formation. In
order to be successful and beat the competition, a business needed to
know what its competitors were doing in order to advantageously position
the firm, as well as distinguish themselves from their competitors. The
four component parts of a competitor analysis were: future goals,
current strategy, the competitors' capabilities, and assumptions about
itself and the industry
For competitor analysis to be helpful to a company, it needed to
include all significant existing competitors and potential competitors
that might enter the industry.
Selection of Strategy
Before a firm was ready to select a strategy, it needed to make an
assessment of the attractiveness of its industry, look at the
opportunities for competitive advantage, make a competitor assessment,
and make an assessment of its own competitive strengths. Only then was
the fir ready to make strategic decisions.
Porter divides strategic decisions into the initial positional
choice between the three generic strategies (i.e., low-cost leadership,
diversification and focus (above)) and what he described as the four
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major strategic decisions occurring in existent firms in industry (i.e.,
vertical integration, major capacity expansion, entry, and divestment).
For more detail see Appendix B (Porter, 1980, pp. 254-361).
b. The Futurists
Clarifying Values: The futurist movement clarified values as a
prelude to strategic planning. The right-brain activity of imagining
the way to a preferred future was a methodology for releasing creative
energies and motivating organizations to set positive, future-oriented
goals. Future-oriented goals were opposed to short-term, symptom-curing
goals designed to relieve the pain caused by current problems.
Futurists thought that the formal strategic planning process addressing
symptoms of problems, and was unlikely to produce more than copy-cat
strategies. They recommended that the futuring process preceed planning
in order to release the creativity and energy necessary for creative
strategies, as well as to create the commitment on the part of those
participals who would see the strategy through. They recommended that
as large a group of people as possible participate in the futuring
process to add additional energy and create a shared strategy.
Clarifying values also gave an initial sense of direction to an
organization and provided the basis for later feedback, motivation, and
renewal.
One of the key distinctions futurists made was between proactive
and reactive strategies. Preferring was seen as developing a proactive
posture of "what do we want to do" rather than a reactive psychology of
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adapting and fitting in. Proactive strategy involved a clarification of
values, and the drafting or revising of the organizational mission
statement.
The futurists placed emphasis on the diagnostic analysis of
alternatives and saw value in developing several paths to arrive at
desired goals. Another concept stressed by futurists was leaving room
for experimentation or rehearsal before locking-in final plans. They
developed a process to "connect images to action"; this paper refers to
that process as probing.
Managers who participated in a futuring process got their data
about the future by: reflecting on the past themes and events; reviewing
plans and policies that have not been fully implemented; looking at
surveys of customer needs and expectations; reviewing current operations
and accomplishments; reviewing policies and goals of superiors; and
reviewing trend data and scanning the goals and successes of others.
c. The Incrementalists
Strategy could be either deliberate and emergent: The
incrementalists freed us from the view that there was a single best way
to make a strategy. Deliberate and emergent strategies formed the two
ends of the continuum along which the strategies crafted in the real
world were found. The extent to which strategies were deliberate or
emergent depended to some extent on cognitive preference of the firm.
Some strategies approached deliberate, some approached emergent, and
many fell at intermediate points. The more deliberate strategy
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formation process fostered controls, and the more emergent process
fostered strategic learning. Pushed to the limit, neither approach made
much sense because all firms needed to couple learning with control.
Strategies were both plans for the future and patterns of past
decisions: An organization could have a pattern or realized strategy
without knowing it, let alone making it explicit. Researchers were
freed from having to look for expressions of past intention (which even
if found, were suspect), and could make better sense of the complexity
and confusion found in reports of past decision making: the endless
meetings, debates between deciders, dead ends, foldings and unfoldings.
Researchers did not have to look for the black ink on a written
"strategic plan" to describe a past strategy, and did not have to
dismiss out of hand the actions of excellent managers who reported
allowing strategies to develop gradually through the organization's
actions and experiences rather than think through everything in advance.
Strategy was better explained by the model of crafting than
strategic planning: The metaphor of crafting evoked traditional skill,
dedication, and perfection through mastery of detail, and gave value to
the connection between the thoughts and actions of decision makers.
Crafting strategy required wisdom: In order to develop a strategy,
a strategist needed: to know the business; to be able to have the kind
of peripheral vision to pick up things that others missed; to be able to
take advantage of events as they unfolded; to be able to detect the
subtle discontinuities that might undermine the business in the future
(a kind of strategic thinking that tended to atrophy in long periods of
stability); to be able to detect emerging patterns and help them take
shape; to help new strategies emerge; and required the wisdom to be able
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to reconcile change and continuity and to know when to promote change
and when to promote stability (Mintzberg, 1987).
Strategic reorganization happened in cycles or brief quantum leaps:
The incrementalists did not believe that strategy formation was
continuous because they saw strategy as rooted in stability, not change.
While they acknowledged that particular strategies might always be
changing marginally, it seemed equally true that major shifts in
strategic orientation occurred very rarely. Organizations seem to need
to separate in time the basic forces of change and stability,
reconciling them by attending to each in turn. Focusing on strategy
continuously was the wrong methodology and, in fact, desensitized the
organization when it needed strategic change.
Effective decision making at the policy level required good
analytical input: The incrementalists saw a clear role for analysis and
hard data in forming good strategies and giving companies advantages.
Studies showed that managers synthesized rather the analyzed data and
preferred soft to hard data: verbal communication, especially meetings
over written communications like reading and writing and soft,
speculative inputs like impressions, feelings about people, hearsay, and
gossip. Therefore, in order to achieve better decisions, planners had a
clear role to play feeding hard data and analytical information to top
managers at the front end of decision making even, if the information
had to be fed verbally (Mintzberg, 1976).
Strategic planning will not produce creative strategies: The
incrementalists reduced formal strategic planning in stature to
programming existent strategy. To manage strategy was to synthesize or
craft thought and action, control and learning, stability and change.
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Because strategic planning was not a process of synthesis, strategic
planning was not a means to create new or creative strategies, but a
means to program a strategy already created, and to work out its
implications formally. Companies that used strategic planning risked
copying the strategies of their competitors (Mintzberg, 1987).
The next chapter presents the context in which firms currently
operate and make strategic decisions in the home building industry. The
analytical framework in Chapter 3 is applied to five companies in the
home building industry in order to understand their strategic planning
history.
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Chapter 2 - Industry Context
Home building firms work in an industry that is badly fragmented,
highly cyclical, and very competitive. The industry has problems of
chronic oversupply, and since 1987, has experienced an absolute decline in
the number of yearly housing starts and sales. This chapter provides a
sense of the industry context to better understand the strategic decisions
of firms in the case studies.
The home building industry is very fragmented: The conditions that
cause industry fragmentation are; low overall entry barriers;
site-specific producion that results in high transportation costs; an
absence of economies of scale because of erratic sales fluctuations; no
real advantages of size in dealing with suppliers and buyers; some
diseconomies that give smaller firms an advantage; diverse markets with
fragmented buyer tastes; a local regulatory environment and a new
industry. While the presence of any one of these factors can fragment an
industry, most of them apply to home building to some extent (Porter,
1980).
Fragmentation gives firms a sense of being at the mercy of forces
around them (i.e., interest rates, cost of land, cost of labor, federal
monetary policy, federal housing policy), and often encourages a failure
on the part of firms to address strategic issues. They hope that
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entrepreneurial talent and pursuit of opportunity will be enough.
However, just the opposite is true. Firms need clearer generic strategies
and more strategic discipline in a fragmented industry just to avoid
serious mistakes.
Common strategies in a fragmented industry are; product
differentiation, and focus by product type, by customer type, and/or by
geographical area. However, firms may find it difficult to differentiate
products and achieve a "brand identity" because each buyer purchases so
few homes and the home purchase price is so high relative to the buyer's
income. It is also common to see firms try to combat fragmentation by
keeping staffing costs down to a bare minimum. Firms also try to create
economies of scale through greater capital intensity, greater f-inancial
sophistication, and by recognizing industry trends early.
In the home building industry, some strategies do not work. The less
successful strategies tend to be completely opportunistic and
undisciplined, aim at industry dominance 1, require too much
centralization, or rest the entire future of the firm on the success of a
completely new product type.
The home building industry is a very cyclical industry: In the forty
years since World War II, there have been seven distinct cycles, with the
time between highs and lows ranging from 10 months to three and one-half
years, and with production falling off by as little as thirty three
percent and as much sixty-four percent (National Association of Home
Builders, 1986, p. 59). But according to data supplied by the National
Association of Home Builders, smaller firms do not leave the industry
during down cycles, they just tend to stop building (Biggers, 1987). This
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leads to inflated expectations about the potential of the upswings.
The home building industry is very competitive: There are a large
number of competitors because of low overall entry barriers, all of whom
are trying to preempt the market. There is an absence of market leaders
who can retaliate against aggressive overbuilding because of
fragmentation. New entries add to the problem because they seek a part of
the market-share held by incumbents. Additionally, the large number of
competitors and the long project lead time makes market signaling less
effective because firms can not keep up with the signals of so many
competitors.
The Home building experiences problems of chronic oversupply: The
problems of oversupply are more acute in industries like home building
that are cyclical in nature, and/or in industries where it is difficult
for firms to achieve product differentiation. The long lead time from
idea to product makes oversupply more likely because it requires that
firms base their decisions to increase volume on projections of demand and
Ned Eichler, in his fascinating study of merchant builders, explained
why dominance was not a strategy of even the largest builders. According
to Eichler, " Not even the largest firm has any of the advantages of
dominant firms in other industries. Little or no capital is required for
plant and equipment, money to buy land, install improvements, build
houses, and pay overhead has been increasingly available to smaller
operations at a cost only marginally higher than that of the largest
firms. What little technology that exists is available to all. No large
firm has a dealer network, supplier arrangements, a national reputation,
or any other characteristic that gives it a meaningful edge over smaller
firms. Merchant builders vie with each other by trying to make better
judgements about site selection and product choice and by maintaining
better control over all activities, principally construction and
marketing" (Eichler, 1982, p. 269).
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competitive behavior far into the future, or pay the penalty of not having
product available if and when the demand materializes.
It is standard practice in the home building industry to base new
capacity decisions on market studies which provide some estimates of
future demand and some information on the current output of competitors,
These market studies are not sufficient because they report only on what
competitors are doing and do not predict the moves their competitors might
make based upon the competitors' expectations about the industry and their
goals. Without better competitor analysis and a good predictive
mechanism, firms lack an overall picture of the industry supply and demand
balance, and cannot escape the adverse consequences of overbuilt cycles.
Likewise, lenders may contribute to overbuilding by making capital
available to all comers, making it possible for marginal projects to be
built.
Absolute Decline: There has been a absolute decline in the numbers of
housing starts and the numbers of new homes sold in the last ten years, a
trend that is projected to continue into the future because of changing
demographics. For example, in 1977, which was a good year there were
1,987,000 starts and 819,000 homes sold. In 1986 ,another good year,
there were only 1,806,000 starts and 750,000 homes sold, and 1986 was the
best year since 1978. Starts dropped as low as 1,014,000 in 1981.
(Biggers, 1987). Uncertainty accompanied this decline and there has not
been an orderly retreat of firms from the industry.
The competitive nature of the industry, the absolute decline in sales
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and recurrent cycles all combine to detract from the attractiveness of the
home building industry. The competitive industry structure tends to drive
down profit margins. Tthe frequency of market cycles makes it possible
for firms that blunder to incur substantial losses by being caught holding
unsold homes or apartments for long periods of time. In the 1980s
established firms have tended to diversify, both within and outside of the
industry, to maintain their profit margins and combat the cycles (Adams
and Mcluster, May 1987).
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Chapter 3 - Case Studies
Introduction to the Case Studies
I selected the strategic decisions confronting firms in the home
building industry as my thesis topic because I was intrigued by comments
made by three home builders who spoke to my class at MIT in 1987. All
three spoke of their own experiences and organizations. One speaker
discussed the "necessity" of developing in-house construction skills,
another focused on the competitive advantage of in-house management
capability in rental housing, and the third speaker acknowledged making
the decision to enter the multifamily rental business in the Northeast
because the difficult regulatory environment presented entry barriers
for competitors. This thesis provides an opportunity to develop those
experiences into case studies.- This chapter includes five case studies
of firms, including the firms of two of the guest lecturers whose
comments sparked my interest in this research. The names of the firms,
the principals, and major projects have all been altered to protect the
firms.
My research model was taken in large part from a work by Daft,
"Learning the Craft of Organizational Research" (1983). Daft argues
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that formal qualitative and quantitative research techniques may not
produce significant research. Rather, he says,
"Significant research grows out of experience and mastery of the
attitudes that make up the research craft. The craft is enhanced by
respect for error and surprise, storytelling, research poetry,
emotional involvement of the researcher, common sense, firsthand
learning and exchanges with research colleagues (Daft, 1983, p.
340).
The research process for this thesis did not begin with full blown
comprehensive theories to be proved or disproved, but with some hunches.
Strategic planning theory provided a theoretical framework for my
research. A few key concepts provided the building blocks around which
the strategic stories of the five contemporary home builders were woven.
The concepts were the firm's history and present capabilities,
managerial values and preferences, organizational structure and the
strategic planning process, competitive environment, generic strategy,
and the four strategic decisions (vertical integration, capacity
expansion, entry and exit).
The firms were chosen for several reasons. For the sake of the
researcher's convenience they were all located in the Northeast. To
facilitate access to decision makers, the firms were members of the MIT
Center for Real Estate Development and/or the Massachusetts Association
of Home Builders. To find stories worth telling all five were firms
ones with a "good reputation" and were viewed by their peers as
successful, assuming that success, however defined, indicated a history
of good decisions.
To present a diversity of generic strategies, the firms represented
the major groupings of companies in the industry: the small home builder
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(25 or less starts a year), the small high-end home builder (25-50
starts a year), the mid-sized condominium builder (100 plus starts a
year), mid-sized multifamily developers (projects of more than 150 new
units or 75 rehabs units a year) and the high-volume large multifamily
developers (1000 plus starts a year).
Because the research was confined to the Northeast, the reader will
not get a picture of the strategic decisions of the very large single
family home builders (5000 starts a year) whose strategies are based on
economies of scale and low-cost position. High land prices have kept
the volume builders out of the Northeast.
I studied only firms that had their roots in the home building
industry or related industries; four of the firms were single business
firms with 95% of their business in the home building industry, and one
firm was a related business firm that diversified into home building
from commercial real estate development, a related industry. The
related firm was included because of the current interest in home
building by office developers facing an overbuilt office market.
The research technique for the case studies was person-to-person
interviews. The proprietary nature of planning information eliminated
questionnaires as an information-gathering method. A survey could not
provide answers to non-quantitative questions about decision making.
Prior to the interviews I read extensively about the history of the
industry and current trends, and interviewed several industry
participants to probe further into the current industry context.
The interview protocol was largely adapted from the strategic
planning literature. It is included in Appendix C. As much as possible,
representatives from each company were asked the same questions.
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Whenever possible I conducted a preliminary interview with a senior
staff person to gather factual data in order to make the most productive
use of my time with the decision makers. I then conducted a second
interview with at least one key decision maker in the firm to
investigate the firm's strategy and strategic decision making process.
During this interview, I tried to find out what the decision makers had
wanted to do, what strategic decisions they had made, why they made
them, what information they used, and what they would have done in
hindsight.
The methodology was not without difficulties. It was impossible to
get a complete picture because I had only a limited amount of time with
the decision makers, and seldom had time with all of them. Much of the
information I requested was proprietary, and therefore unavailable to
me. The home building industry is very opportunity-based and
fragmented. This limited the type and quality of planning information
that firms typically use. None of the firms had written strategic plans
or records of key decisions. Nor did home builders use strategic
planning concepts in their conversation. They tend to talk about the
land they bought, and why they bought it, rather than their firm's quest
for "market-share" or "product differentiation." Therefore, the case
studies are necessarily limited descriptions of a very complex process.
Both the analytical framework and the findings are refined common
sense as expressed in the following quotation:
"We come from common sense, we work for a long time, and we
give back to common sense, refined, original and strange notions
that enrich what we know. We come to new things.... that we already
know" (Oppenheimer, 1958, p. 129).
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Case # 1 - The Small Home Builder
Company Description: North Shore Homes was a small home building
company that built ten to fifteen houses a year. John Daugherty, the
founder and President of North Shore Homes, envisioned his company in a
industry grouping with 95% of the other home builders. North Shore
Homes built only custom homes for the mid-market in three towns on North
Shore, specializing in energy-efficient homes and devoting considerable
attention to detail. In 1987 the company employed seventeen people.
Company History: North Shore Homes began in 1974 during the bottom
of a home building cycle. In Daugherty's words, "We had nowhere to go
but up." The firm was formed as a partnership between Daugherty and his
brother. They employed three carpenters and built homes on finished
lots for other developers and owners. The firm's lack of capital kept
them from taking advantage of the federal home building programs which
Daugherty said only worked for volume builders. The firm built for
first-time home buyers, and Daugherty remembers that their average
turnaround time from raw land to finished product was less than one
year, with approvals taking them only two months in 1974, and that it
was possible to complete the paper work and still have six hours in the
day to "pound nails."
North Shore Homes remained small in size. The firm rejected
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opportunities that required expanding staff in order to keep
administrative costs down. The firm operated locally, within an hour's
drive of Daugherty's office. This allowed them to build a local
reputation and become familiar with the buyers.
The firm's flexibility and low overhead kept its prices
competitive until the affordability crisis of the 1980s forced the firm
to change its target buyer group from first-time to mid-market buyers
and necessitated a product change to attract the new buyers. The new
product was well designed and energy-efficient. North Shore Homes was
able to compete with larger developers because they could build on
scattered lots. They also built on the smaller subdivisions on the
Cape.
All homes were pre-sold to avoid the market risk. The firm did
not land bank, preferring to stay liquid. Occasionally the firm made
phasing agreements with towns to obtain necessary permits. North Shore
Homes offered second mortgages to their buyers to increase sales, and
the mortgage income helped smooth over the bad part of cycles. By the
mid-1980s, Daugherty was in a better cash position. This allowed him to
completely avoid the complexities and expense of borrowing by taking out
a personal line of credit that was collateralized against other assets.
North Shore Homes did not need to joint venture.
North Shore Homes vertically integrated into development in the
1980s to expand the company without expanding personnel. The firm
backward integrated into land development because its profits were being
squeezed by increasing regulatory costs. Daugherty said,
"The builder today has to deal with the state consumer protection
statute's triple damage penalties, the Wetlands Act, the state
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sanitary code, zoning regulations, and new town regulations. The
increased regulation adds over $30,000 to the price of a house, and
affects affordability."
There were much greater profits in land development. The firm sold
developed lots to "smaller builders who don't have the patience to go
through the permitting process." The decision to sell lots signaled a
strategic shift out of home building for the firm
During the downturn of the early 1980s, North Shore Homes also
started diversifying into office buildings. The firm bought office
buildings and rehabilitating them. The decision was made to buy an
office building rather than raw land because rental property had an
income stream to offset financing costs. North Shore Homes was willing
accept initial rental losses if they could see a clear income stream
after four years. Daugherty believed that the diversification into
commercial buildings helped the housing business survive the down
cycles. The firm made as much profit on one office building in 1987 as
it made on fourteen homes. Daugherty said, "I had to diversify. I
couldn't survive as a single home builder." Daugherty saw North Shore
Homes completely diversified out of home building by 1997. He said,
"Many good builders will be out because there is too much competition."
Values and Preferences of Principal(s): Daugherty was
college-educated and he approached his business professionally. He
preferred to build for the first-time homebuyer, and had sympathy for
"the average hard working guy." He believed in energy conservation. In
the 1980s, Daugherty become an active lobbyist to combat the increasing
regulatory problems that were squeezing the first-time buyer out of the
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market. Daugherty served on the local planning board, and on the State
Zoning Board. He said that when he began his business, he did not see
lobbying as part of his job.
Organizational Structure and the Planning Process: Daugherty and
his brother remained partners. Daugherty spent all his time on
permitting and other project management issues, and his brother
supervised construction. Decisions were made informally, usually by
Daugherty. The partnership worked well because they gave each other a
great deal of latitude. There was no formal planning process, and most
decisions were made in response to environmental pressures.
North Shore Homes had difficulty retaining competent staff.
Despite receiving increased salaries, fringe benefits and profit
sharing, most employees left after a few years to go into business for
themselves.
To stay abreast of business cycles, Daugherty paid attention to the
fluctuation in the discount rate, the price of lumber, the number of
housing starts, interest rate fluctuations, the federal deficit and
federal monetary policy, and the relationship of the yen to the
dollar.
Generic Strategy: North Shore Home's initial strategy was a
focused-cost leadership strategy. The firm was focused by market, and
developed a set of policies to keep costs down and prices low by keeping
the firm small, localized and flexible. A clear shift in strategy did
not accompany the shift to mid-market buyers and a more differentiated
product. The firm was competing with a more expensive product for what
36
had become the new low-end of the market. All of the firm's
cost-leadership policies remained in place. The new strategy was not
successful. Rising costs forced the firm to bid away its profits to
retain its buyers.
Evaluation of Strategy
The firm's strategy was implicit, largely intuitive and shared by
both partners although there was a dominant decision maker. Decisions
were made on the basis of informal probing of the market and the
judgement of the decision maker.
The initial strategy reflected the partner's personal preference
for a specific buyer group. Subsequent strategies reflected an interest
in energy conservation, and drew upon the president's sense of fair play
and political skills.
The core strategy exploited the market opportunities available to a
small builder starting without a lot of money. The major strategic
decision to diversify into office buildings was made in reaction to the
economic downturn of 1981. The decision to shift buyer groups was a
reaction to the subsequent affordability crisis. Increased capital
resources allowed the company to be more proactive and allowed it to
exploit opportunities in land development.
The shifts in buyer group, into commercial development and into
land development, were consistent with the core no frills pattern. The
scale of the office buildings were similar enough to homes that North
Shore Homes merely shifted its crews over to the office buildings,
giving them work in down times.
37
The firm's core strategy was successful until the affordability
crisis of the 1980s forced the firm to change its buyer group target to
mid-market. This niche was not as profitable for the company because
there was more competition for that buyer group and fewer potential
buyers. The company's profits diminished because of the increased cost
of land, materials and the changing regulatory environment. The firm
collaborated with other builders to reverse some of the regulatory
decisions that had created the crisis. The results of the political
response are not yet known. The decisions to develop land and diversify
into office buildings have been financially successful and chart the
future direction of North Shore Homes.
Case Number 2 - The Small High-End Builder
Company Description: Authentic Homes was a small company building
colonial homes and condominiums for the luxury market in three historic
and exclusive Massachusetts towns. Authentic Home's residential
business catered to a market segment just below the high-end; in 1987
this meant homes priced just under $600,000. Residential development
was 70% of Authentic Homes' business. The other 30% of the business was
colonial, retail and office condominiums. The company was fully
integrated and handled all aspects of their product including land
development, architectural design, construction, interior design, sales
and management. The president's business partner (and wife) also owned
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and operated an antique furniture store adjacent to the company office.
Authentic Homes employed twenty-seven people and had a business
volume of 10 million dollars in 1986; they expected to do between twelve
and fourteen million dollars in 1987. In 1986 they started fifteen
retail condominiums and ten homes; in 1987 they started fifteen custom
homes and fifteen office condominiums as well as starting the
infrastructure on a fifty-four unit residential subdivision.
Company History: Authentic Homes was founded in the late 1940s by
Mark Miller. His father and father-in-law were builders of traditional
colonial homes and Miller inherited their interest in colonial
architecture and their concern for authenticity. Miller's wife, an
interior designer shared his passion. Although Miller was a flyer
during and after World War II, he believed that a building career was
inevitable. Miller financed his business by working as a printer at
night. He started with a goal of building four houses a year, which he
reached in the early 1950s.
Miller's business quickly grew and was soon at fifteen to
twenty-five starts a year. His product was a very traditional Georgian
house, similar to the authentic Georgian houses first built in
Massachusetts in the 1780s. Miller believed that "a traditional home
had a wider appeal than a contemporary house because a traditional house
was acceptable to a person with contemporary taste, but a contemporary
house wasn't acceptable to a person with traditional taste." Miller was
proud that his houses were the only ones in the area that featured
granite hearths.
Miller quickly discovered that his real skills were in planning.
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He recruited his brother, a field superintendent, to start a
construction company and soon had seven carpenters on the payroll. The
construction company also sold construction services to other developers
for residential, commercial and rehabilitation jobs. In 1962, Miller
incorporated the business. He added an architectural staff and an
interior design company run by his wife. Miller quickly learned how to
borrow money and was appointed to several bank boards. He also dabbled
in lending to customers; this was profitable in the economic
downswings.
Authentic Homes developed a profitable market niche building
colonial homes for wealthy buyers in a limited geographic area.
Authentic Homes' products were not identical, ranging in architectural
style from Georgian to early Victorian, but were easily identified with
Authentic Homes. The company had an excellent reputation for providing
a quality product which included authentic colonial interior finish,
landscaping and management services. Authentic Homes was concerned with
custom quality control and, therefore, did not expand production beyond
fifty units. Miller said that, in his opinion, a twenty-five unit limit
was much safer.
Miller was able to use his knowledge of the market to develop new
product lines: the first residential condominiums in the area in 1971;
mixing single detached homes and residential condominiums with the
amenity of grounds management in 1977; the first office condominium in
New England in 1980. Miller's good name moved his innovations through
the town meeting process and helped the firm acquire land.
The firm did not conduct market surveys. Miller felt that surveys
were not needed because they operated in a small area where traditional
40
homes were accepted. To limit risk, all projects were introduced and
proven on a small scale and product exposures were kept to eighteen
months. The company did not emphasize financial controls.
The Miller family, through a separate company, retained a
percentage of units in every complex developed. The units retained were
usually the last sold and allowed the family to enjoy the benefits of
equity appreciation.
Miller was cost-conscious in spite of building for a high-end
market. He could estimate the costs on a project within a ten percent
margin of error. The firm historically had access to capital through
Miller's banking affiliations, and in recent years projects were funded
internally out of retained earnings.
Miller was very careful not to expand out of his defined geographic
market, likening his approach to a bullet. Although sometimes it was
hard not to yield to a shotgun approach because of all the opportunities
presented to him.
Miller said that he encountered competition twenty years ago but he
outperformed them. He became so confident of his abilities that in the
past he had sold finished lots to builders trying to copy his product.
Miller felt that the difficulty of doing business in the Northeast was a
blessing in disquise, keeping out many potential competitors.
In 1987, the local competition was insignificant. Authentic Homes'
main competitor was a small developer in the $625,000 to $700,000 range.
Another competitor was an "interloper" doing infill work. Of greater
concern was a local land developer whose poor work resulted in the
planning board passing new restrictions.
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Vertical Integration: Authentic Homes' vertical integration into
construction, architecture, interior design and management served the
company's strategy of providing an architecturally unique product to a
high end market. The balance between internal advantages and internal
costs was struck by selling surplus construction, interior design and
management services on the market.
Internal Entry: Authentic Homes' entered the office condominium
market successfully in 1981. Authentic Homes was able to avoid high
entry costs by utilizing existing staff, and developing an office
product was not substantially different in scale or design from its
Georgian home. The firm "slid" into this decision in the 1970s when the
interest rate rose dramatically to 18%. Authentic Homes needed an even
less price-sensitive market that could withstand the high interest
rates. Authentic Homes' good local reputation gave it special
advantages in pioneer the office condominium concept.
Miller created a new market niche for him company. He discovered
that there was a market among professionals for small offices in
buildings with a "colonial look." There was no similar product and no
competition. The suburban office developers were not offering small
floor plans. While marketing the first project, Miller discovered that
the smallest units sold the best and that 800 square feet was the most
salable unit size. He incorporated this information into subsequent
projects, and later taught a course on the concept at a leading design
school.
The office condominium business had a positive effect on the
residential business; it evened out the downturns. The entry was
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profitable. The generic concept for entry was similar to Authentic
Homes' residential strategy: offer a superior product; discover a new
niche; introduce a market innovation; and piggyback on the
already-existing design, construction, interior design and management
staff.
Authentic Homes' Exit Decision: In 1985, Miller, acting on his own,
sold the firm to a British multinational, Albert McUsher, P.L.C., for
personal reasons. When the sale occurred, the firm was profitable and
sales were strong. According to Miller,
"It had a lot to do with my age. I wanted to set my family up
while they were in their prime. The firm wasn't on the. market. I
didn't believe that there was a market for builders. I hadn't
decided to sell. It was just the opposite. They came to me. I
guess I had built a name over the years. They bought my inventory,
but not all of my assets. I'm satisfied with what I got. I don't
know that my family agreed. I thought it was the right thing to do
and I did it. I guess the British were happy. We made them a
whole lot of money last year. They bought a winner."
The sale to McUsher, changed the firm's strategy. According to
Miller,
"There isn't too much they add to us. They keep pushing for more
volume, a 20% increase a year. And their money has strings
attached. If our British friends keep looking for volume, we will
lose what we have."
Values and Preferences of the principal(s): Miller said that he
learned the lesson of stewardship and applied it to his dealings with
his family, his community and his church. Miller contributed to the
community through civic activities, and donated construction services to
the town for several projects. He said, "I don't have to earn X number
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of dollars come hell or high water." He took pride in the fact that
people came back to him for their second and third homes, and was also
proud of surviving in the home building business for over 40 years.
Organizational Structure and the Planning Process: Before 1985,
Authentic Homes was a privately held corporation. Miller and his wife
were the owners, although Miller was the more aggressive decision maker.
Around 1980, Miller's daughter and her husband joined the company.
According to Miller, his daughter took an aggressive interest in the
company and decisions were made on the basis of discussion and
negotiation.
In 1985, Miller entered into an agreement to sell to a British
company, McUsher, over a four year phased buy-out period. All family
members were retained. Miller received performance incentives and
agreed to sit on the Board of Albert McUsher Homes, USA during that
period.
The management plan called for controlled decentralization; Miller
provided the business plan and according to their gentlemen's agreement,
Miller had full authority to run the company. McUsher supplied the
financial controls, production targets and access to financial resources
and centralized audits. (See Appendix D for more detail on the British
multinational and their acquisition decision.)
Evaluation of Strategy
Authentic Homes had a clearly articulated and coherent strategy
which was a perfect example of Porter's generic focus-differentiation
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strategy. They provided a unique product for a high-income buyer
segment in a very localized market. The differentiated product allowed
the firm to cater to less price-sensitive buyers who would pay more for
quality. The firm's vertical integration into construction,
architecture, interior design and management were strategic decisions
that flowed from product differentiation. The core strategy was applied
to all product types. And the company was very disciplined about
rejecting opportunities that conflicted with its strategy.
The strategy was crafted by Miller and his wife over time rather
than being formulated in advance. The strategy was shared between
Miller and his wife, and Miller functioned as the dominant decision
maker. Analytical material was used but decisions were made on the
basis of judgement rather than formal analysis. The exit decision was
based on Miller's values and ethics and was apparently made by Miller
alone. The introduction of Miller's daughter and son-in-law changed the
basis upon which decisions were made in the firm. Decisions which fit
clearly into the company strategy were unanimous, otherwise they were
made by discussion and bargaining between the parties.
Decision making changed even more when the firm was sold to an
English company. Strategy was no longer shared, and the basis of the
decisions had more analysis than judgement.
Initially, McUsher's acquisition goals indicated an appreciation of
the focused/differentiated strategy Authentic Homes had been pursuing
over the years. However, by 1987 there were indications of divergence,
as the McUsher strategy was becoming substantially different from the
focused strategy of Authentic Homes. The new McUsher strategy was
neither clear nor explicit. The centerpiece of the strategy appeared to
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be throwing cash at growth and establishing a beachhead for McUsher in
the U.S. (See Appendix D for more detail.) This indicated a future
change in strategic direction for Authentic Homes.
The focused/differentiated strategy was appropriate for a family
business and reflected the aesthetic values and preferences of the
Miller family. Miller's exit decision reflected his sense of
stewardship toward his family. The discipline to stay small will
probably not be appropriate for a British multinational looking to
invest substantial amounts of cash in the U.S.
Authentic Homes' strategy was proactive. The company's innovations
were always well-timed, well-crafted and based on an understanding that
people would pay for good design, even in downturns, if the product was
right.
Much of the organizational infrastructure to support the strategy
was in place within the Miller family, and additional family members
were brought in to provide the new management needed for the expansion.
However, Authentic Homes did not develop a financial and accounting
infrastructure as it grew.
Authentic Homes was a successful and profitable company and
survived forty volatile years in the home building industry. The
company experienced peaks and valleys which required strategy shifts and
refocusing of the companies efforts every ten years. Authentic Homes
emerged out of each downturn a more stable and profitable company, able
to beat its competition and provide a quality product.
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Case # 3 -The Mid-Sized Condominium Builder
Company Description: Sullivan and Smart was a national developer of
suburban office buildings headquartered in Massachusetts. The company
was founded in 1965 and achieved some early successes. By 1970, the
company had grown to fifty employees.
In 1970, Sullivan and Smart's officers decided to diversify into
the residential business as a large-scale luxury condominium developer.
From 1970 to 1980, S&S built five major developments, four luxury
condominiums and one luxury rental project, and became one of the
largest condominium developers in the state.
S&S averaged over 100 starts a year and had a business volume in
excess of $15,000,000 a year. While they aimed at a 15% to 20% profit
margin, they did not achieve it until the last project.
The company left the home building industry in 1891 in order to
attend to the needs of their office business, which had grown to 300
employees and had opened four regional offices.
Company History: The decision to enter home building was made to
generate cash for the firm's primary office development business.
According to Sullivan,
"We made the decision to get into condominiums because we thought
we should diversify. In 1970 the office market was flat and we
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thought we shouldn't have everything in office buildings. We
thought that we could bring in cash flow from the sale of
condominiums, and that we could shelter the income with unused tax
shelters from our office buildings. And the business cycles for
residential and commercial run counter to each other."
S&S's generic concept for entry into residential development was to
offer a superior product. The firm used existing staff and
organizational resources and did not incur special investment costs to
enter the condominium market.
Condominiums were a new product in 1970. The concept, invented in
California in 1964, was almost unknown in Massachusetts in 1970. The
firm expected no competition. Motivated primarily by the enthusiasm of
Sullivan, the past-president, S&S decided to pioneer the product. The
product was so new that S&S had to hire an outside expert to assist
their attorneys in drawing up condominium documents.
The firm's reputation enabled them to locate sites in the "nicer"
communities. S&S had the job of introducing the condominium concept
into the towns they worked in. To win local acceptance of condominium
developments, the firm placed an emphasis on architectural quality and
site design. The firm invested substantial executive time and attention
into the new venture. Sullivan personally handled the approval and
zoning process.
S&S's target market was empty nesters in Boston's most exclusive
suburbs who were moving down from lovely five and six-bedroom homes.
S&S found the buyers somewhat price-sensitive because the buyers did not
understand why a new condominium costs more than their beautiful, old,
large homes. Buyers usually had to sell their existing homes in order
to buy S&S's product which caused problems during the disintermediation
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period in the 1970s when no mortgage money was available, and S&S's
potential buyers could not sell. This forced S&S to get involved in
financing.
A great deal of emphasis was put on pre-marketing techniques; phone
and door-to-door surveys were used to discover the buyers' needs. A
pre-marketing and sales team was set up.
S&S's first effort was a 150-unit complex built on an old manor
site. The project had great market acceptability but S&S got into some
financial difficulty. The build-out took three instead of four years
because of disintermediation; construction delays caused some buyers to
break their purchase and sale agreements, and S&S had problems with
custom quality control.
Although all of S&S's projects were well received and attracted
prestigious buyers, S&S paid a tuition on its first four projects, none
of which met profit expectations. S&S's last project won a National
Association of Home Builders/Better Homes and Gardens Yearly Award for
the Best Residential Projec, because of its architectural excellence and
environmentally sensitive site plan.
Vertical. Integration: S&S developed an in-house construction firm,
and a management company. For its work, S&S received a construction fee
and a management fee but the primary motivation to start the
construction company was strategic.
"We couldn't deliver a quality product unless we controlled the
construction. We were trying to deliver seventy luxury homes a
year, one a week, and there was a lot of finish work in those
homes. We weren't just looking for efficiencies when we set up out
construction company, we were also concerned with controlling the
subcontractors. Many of the skills in the trades were terrible."
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Over the years the company solved all of the construction problems
of residential development except custom quality control. They had to
bring in an outside construction company with a good finish reputation.
That company was Authentic Homes.
All of the projects were developed as joint ventures with banks.
The banks also earned fees on the end user mortgages. S&S's policy of
joint venturing their condominium developments with banks, a form of
quasi integration, increased S&S's access to mortgage money during the
disintermediation crisis.
The Exit Decision: S&S was a successful condominium developer when
it made its exit decision in 1980. Sullivan said,
"We had finally made it after seven years: we had a competent
staff; good joint venture partners; we had won a design award; we
had presidents of companies living in our units; we were making
money; we were the largest builder of luxury housing in the Boston
area; we received more good publicity for our housing than we ever
had for our office buildings.
But the residential business was incompatible with the
commercial business we were in. Our office business had gone
through the recession in the mid 1970s, and we had to let go
twenty percent of our staff. At the same time we had opened four
regional offices. We had to come to grips with a commercial
business that wasn't as strong as it needed to be."
In 1980, the S&S executive committee voted to leave the
residential housing. After finishing the build-out on the last project
the residential staff was absorbed into the office business.
Organizational Structure and the Planning Process:The planning
process prior to entry was described by Sullivan:
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"We had done some planning. We had our organizational chart, and
we had done the cash flows two years in advance. We thought a lot
about where we wanted to work. We looked at a lot of locations.
When we took on another project, we made sure it fit our company's
requirements, and that became a business plan."
It took the company seven years to develop a "first-class team"
consisting of a marketing manager, a project manager and a construction
manager and a secretary. All of the team members were hand picked for
their ability to make decisions in the field, and none came from the
commercial side of the company, although most had commercial as well as
residential project responsibilities. The residential business
administratively remained a part of the overall company, and team
members were supervised separately by the vice presidents of marketing,
construction and project development.
Decisions at S&S were made by an executive committee that was
composed of the President, the Chairman, the head of the Construction
Company, the head of property management and the heads of the regional
offices.
Values and Preferences of the principal(s): S&S developed
condominiums to generate cash flow for their commercial real estate
business.
"We hadn't capitalized our company, and we needed cash to support a
large organization. We wanted to make a product that we could put
on a production line to develop cash. We mistakenly thought
condominiums were just like office development because all the
units could be concentrated in a few buildings."
The President liked residential development:
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"It was very personal and human. There was lots of
satisfaction because ninety-five percent of the people were
wonderful. The rezonings and community part of the business
was fun. It was a very high-profile effort to be the first in
the community."
S&S was also a "quality" office builder. The company wanted to
extend its reputation for quality into the residential field and the
president felt a social responsibility to leave the environment better
than he found it.
Support for the residential developments never spread outside a
narrow group of people inside the company. Sullivan was the only
executive committee member who was personally involved. He said that he
had always thought that the company would grow to be more enthusiastic
about home building, but it did not.
The difference between office and residential development was
partly responsible for the lack of enthusiasm. Building a 150-unit
condominium project in three buildings was not like building three
office buildings; it was more like building 150 separate homes. Office
development was much more profitable and involved much less work.
Office development took place during conventional working hours; the
buyer, most often a man, made a business decision to lease space. The
residential business took place twenty-four hours a day, seven days a
week; the buyer, often a woman, made a personal decision to buy a home,
which was often the family's most expensive purchase; officers of the
firm were contacted at home by buyers at all hours and were named as
co-defendents in law suits brought by the condominium associations
against the firm. The fact that the law suits were ultimately
insubstantial did not make them less vexing.
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Evaluation of Strategy
The firm had an clear and articulated strategy. It was a volume
producer of a specialized luxury product. Porter would describe its
generic strategy as stuck in the middle. Volume builders are usually
cost leaders and cater to price-sensitive buyers, delivering a lower
price through economies of scale and special relationships with
suppliers. Builders of differentiated products usually try to cater to
a price-insensitive buyer by delivering unique products at very high
prices, which in turn make them less vulnerable to suppliers. They
sacrifice volume for high margins. S&S was stuck-in-the middle because
it had to trade its profits to deliver its luxury finish on a production
schedule. In the process S&S became vulnerable to the contractors, and
also less responsive to its buyers, limiting the amenity package it
offered to buyers to keep prices in line.
The firm had a dominant decision maker in 1970, and most executives
shared the goal of generating cash for the primary office business.
During the ten years the firm implemented the strategy, enthusiasm for
the residential business waned. The residential business never became
more than a very peripheral part of a much larger firm.
Decisions were made in a formal executive committee, and used
financial projections, market studies and other planning materials.
Strategic decisions appeared to be made on the basis of judgement,
discussion and preference.
The chosen strategy was appropriate for the parent firm that was in
the business of building high-quality, large office structures at
substantial profit.
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Sullivan's values and vision were reflected in the strategy. The
condominium developments were beautiful, sensitively handled the
environment, and were a credit to the name of the firm. The emphasis on
satisfying buyers was a reflection of Sullivan's and the marketing
director's values. S&S stayed in residential development through four
financially weak projects because the president was enthusiastic about
housing, and the company left the business, in part, because the other
executive committee members preferred to not be in the housing business
any more and because Sullivan's enthusiasm waned.
The firm's strategy was proactive. The firm sought out
opportunities that fit its strategy. The firm's entry decision was a
good example of exploiting an environmental opportunity, in this case an
opportunity to pioneer the condominium concept.
The decision to diversify into residential development was a
drastic change for the firm. Residential housing was more difficult
than office development because it was more labor intensive and less
profitable. The firm made an initial strategic mistake in expecting the
businesses to be similar, and not putting separate organizational
infrastructures in place to provide for the high risk of a discontinuous
strategy. The company paid a tuition in its first four residential
projects for having to learning a new business.
The strategy was not successful. The diversification into
residential development did not generate cash and help smooth out the
business cycles of the parent. Even though by 1981 the residential
business began to show a profit, the discontinuity between the two
businesses diverted too much executive energy and attention from the
primary business.
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Case # 4 -The Mid-Sized Multifamily Developer
Company Description: The Kimberly Company was formed in 1984. By
1987, it was an established mid-size multifamily developer involved in
several ventures, including rental housing, high-end and low-end
condominiums and land deals. The firm was building its first 140 units
of rental housing and had a total of 600 units in various stages of
development. Its business volume was in excess of ten million per year.
The company's small staff consisted of the president, the senior vice
president and several project managers. It was not vertically
integrated because the principals of the firm made a explicit decision
to keep the staff lean. The firm aimed for 20% profit margins on its
residential product and 39% on its condominiums.
There were some early indications of success. Kimberly Company
created a tremendous amount of value in their land purchases; and they
were the only company able build new rental housing.
Company History: Kimberly Company had two operational partners and
one investment partner. All three brought substantial experience to the
table. The president had spent twenty years working in the rental
housing industry, including several years as a partner with a large New
England based developer. The senior vice president had ten years of
experience in the real estate business working for two major new England
developers, and had masters' degrees in both architecture and
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engineering. The investment partner worked in an advisory capacity to
pension funds. All three had experience in land acquisiton. The
company was well capitalized.
The first year was spent probing markets and exploring various
opportunities and products. Within a year the firm had locked into a
strategy of developing rental housing in the beltway areas. Several
tracts of land large enough to support rental projects of 150 or more
units were purchased. A product prototype was developed. It was a
differentiated, variable apartment unit with a high amenity level. It
had separately metered units to facilitate condominiums if necessary.
Values and- Preferences of the principal(s): The partners emerged
from a housing mold and wanted to become involved in rental housing.
Additionally, all three partners wanted to take pride in their product,
and were willing to leave profits in the business to leverage the
company.
They preferred a regional business and had turned down lucrative
opportunities in other regions because they did not want to "get
murdered by the time change." They looked for opportunities to build
several buildings in a localized market to better leverage their
experience.
They were comfortable taking the market risk, but were not
comfortable taking some financial risks, and developed strategies to
hedge or share those risks. They were willing to land bank, but were
not willing to get extended doing it. And they always considered
alternative uses when they purchased land.
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Organizational Structure and the Planning Process: The senior vice
president explained,
"I spent a lot of time thinking about the market, changes in the
industry, our talents, different markets and products to fit those
markets. And we talked a lot between ourselves about what we were
prepared to do. The secret of being a good investor is knowing
yourself. We did a lot of analysis and then we probed into the
market. We didn't have agreement at first about what to do so we
spent the first year probing other products and then we came back
to rental housing. We looked at regional shopping centers, at
suburban office, at land in off-center markets, at industrial
space, at manufactured housing and at rental housing until we found
our niche. We had a sense of our risk profile which was critical
for decisions."
After locking in the strategic direction, and acquiring land, the
firm started the process of building their organization. The senior
vice president said,
"I wouldn't change any of the strategy, but it always takes longer
than you think. Once you get the strategy and get over the issue
of raw product, you have to build the organization and that's the
tough part... .anticipating what and who you need in staff, and
when. I think about hiring people who have different skills from
me, for example I'm not a controller. I hired someone with a
big-eight accounting background whose personality I thought would
fit."
Strengths and Weaknesses: The firm identified three of its
competitive advantages: experience in large-scale rental housing
finance, being well capitalized, and an ability to predict what was
going to happen in the market.
The Kimberly Company saw itself as a "Mercedes builder and not an
IBM Clone builder." Because each of their projects was somewhat
different,.it could not attain cost efficiencies through duplication.
For example, it was doing 200 units of new construction with a density
of six units to an acre and at the same time doing a rehab of a 140 unit
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historic mill at a density of twenty-two units per acre. Instead, the
firm tried to build a strength in being very facile and being able to
continuously differentiate projects, while remaining focused on large
multifamily buildings and becoming very good at what it did.
The Kimberly company cared a lot about its buyers. It conducted
more surveys than other firms because the president had a background in
marketing, and surveys made him more comfortable with the market risk.
It used telephone preference surveys. Its apartment product was
developed and redeveloped from survey data.
The biggest industry problem in 1987 was finding land. Kimberly
Company's acquisition experience and capitalization give them an
advantage over competitors. The firm was willing to joint venture to
share risk. Their rental projects were syndicated. They had a group of
investors that they knew, and they offered their investors value. The
investors did not have an especially strong position with the firm
because of the limited number of investment opportunities open to them
on the market.
The partners preferred market transactions for construction,
architectural, and management services, and paid premiums to secure
subcontractor services when necessary. The firm had to be facile about
product and it put no strategic premium on vertical integration. The
partners felt that unless the firm was doing huge projects or had
terrific deals, it was hard to carry overhead and survive the downturns.
Instead the partners developed close relations with a limited number of
very good consultants and used them repeatedly. Repeat relationships
gave the firm the bonus of access to two or three top providers of each
service.
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Competitors: The firm paid attention to competitors. Staff
regularly viewed competitors' products, and both staff and the
principals paid close attention to attempts by out-of-state firms to
enter the New England market. Their long-term strategy involved beating
their competition; the short-term strategy was built upon expectations
of competitors' actions and the effect that competitors' product would
have on the market. For example, Kimberly Company expected a glut of
condominium product around the $178,000 price in 1987 because of a state
program which allowed developers to bypass local zoning and density
regulations in return for building a percentage of "affordable housing."
Therefore, Kimberly Company was pricing its products both below and
above that figure to avoid being caught in an overbuilt market.
The Entry Decision: The partners of the Kimberly Company were all
well connected in the industry. Between them they were able to
identify,. analyze, and probe a wide range of markets and products in
their search for a reproducible product.
Substantial entry barriers existed for entrants into the rental
housing industry in 1985-86: high land costs; the absolute limit of
available, buildable land, and the difficult Northeast regulatory
environment. The rental housing industry was in disequilibrium because
of land costs and the Tax Reform Act of 1986 which eliminated tax losses
as a source of project value. The barriers discouraged competitors
despite strong, readily actualizable, demand for rental product. The
Kimberly Company saw an opportunity in the disequilibrium.
Entry involved a significant investment of capital to purchase
59
land. It also required an initial investment to staff a new
organization and front pre-construction costs. However, costs were no
higher for the Kimberly Company than for industry incumbents. In fact,
because they identified the opportunity early, the firm's partners were
able to buy land at a value in 1984 that made "the numbers work" in
1987. No other company was able to build rental housing in 1987, and
the firm enjoyed an advantageous position.
The generic concept for entry was: to fold profits back into the
company to gain market share; to attract renters by offering a superior
unit; and to hedge the financial risk by developing alternate strategies
if interest rates rose sharply making rental development impossible.
The supply-demand situation in the condominium market was different
from that of rental housing and there was much more danger of
overcapacity. Therefore, the Kimberly Company monitored the condominium
market closely.
The firm did not expect any retaliation from incumbents either in
the condominiums or rental housing. The partners left their former
firms cordially, and retaliation was not the industry norm.
In conclusion, the entry was a success. The firm did not incur any
extraordinary costs that would diminish its future profitability.
Evaluation of Strategy
The firm had a clear and explicit strategy. The principals closely
monitored industry trends to exploit a temporary disequilibrium to the
firm's competitive advantage. It relied on rising entry barriers to
protect the firm and make its investments more profitable. This
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strategy was focused by product, location, and by buyer. The high
demand for rental product allowed the firm to differentiate their
product rather than go for a cost-leadership position.
The strategy proactively created a competitive advantage. The firm
did not have a written strategic plan and the strategy chosen resulted
from a long period of strategic thinking, discussions, analysis, and
probing the market. The strategy was the negotiated result of the
probing period and was shared.
The main strategist in the firm was not the dominant decision maker
because of larger capital contributions of the other partners. The
method of decision making included initial analysis, judgement and
extensive discussions and bargaining between the partners.
The values and preferences of the partners had a great deal to do
with determining the initial direction of the firm. Many of the values
were economic. All three partners had a cognitive preference for
analysis.
The strategy fully exploited the environmental opportunity that
existed. While the strategy was proactive, a great deal of room for
experimentation and further crafting of the strategy was built into the
planning and implementation process.
The strategy chosen lowered risk and was consistent with the
backgrounds and experiences of the partners. Having chosen the
strategy, the firm embarked "on the hardest part," putting the necessary
organizational infrastructure in place.
To date, the strategy has been successful in creating a competitive
advantage for the company. The company seized an opportunity and, at
least temporarily, locked out its competition.
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Case Study #5 -The High-Volume, Large Multifamily Developer
Company Description: In 1987, Finnerty, Malloy and Kendall (FMK)
was the 37th largest builder in the country. It was the only
New-England-based company on the Builder Magazine "100 Largest Companies
List for 1987" (Builder, May 1987). The company's revenues grossed 110
million dollars; had 2237 housing starts, 717 condominiums, 1520 rental
units, and another 3000 units in the pipeline; three projects that were
in excess of 100 million dollars, two market rate condominium
developments of over 1000 units, and a 200 million dollar, mixed-income
rehabilitation of a 1400 failed housing project.
FMK built developments in California, Massachusetts, Florida,
Maryland, Washington D.C., New York and Virginia. It employed 500
people, with a development staff of 35 and a central office staff of 80.
It also had a North Central regional office. Financial controls and
accounting for all of the regions were centralized in the New England
office.
It built condominiums in large, well located, planned unit
developments which customers associate with quality. It also had the
capability of doing large multifamily rental projects with a threshold
requirement of 150 units to enable the company to syndicate. FMK was
willing to accept margins under 10% on large volume projects.
It was a fully integrated company with construction, management,
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syndication, and mortgage banking spun off into separate companies under
the FMK umbrella but was not involved in either land development or
architectural services. FMK was also diversified into non-residential
development (hotels, offices, convention centers) on sites adjacent to
its housing developments.
Company History: FMK was founded in 1971 by Tom Finnerty. Finnerty
obtained ten years of experience building market rate rental housing
with his brother's real estate company. In 1968, Finnerty ended a short
political career, narrowly losing a state representative seat in one of
Boston's Irish neighborhoods. He became interested in the new federal
and state low-income housing programs, an interest his brother did not
share.
Michael Malloy gained ten years experience at the Federal Housing
Administration as an appraiser and a development consultant with a
speciality in government programs. Both Finnerty and Malloy had an
interest in apartment development and both wanted to apply the luxury
approach to subsidized housing. It was no surprise when Finnerty asked
Malloy to join him as a partner in 1971.
Jim Kendall joined shortly afterwards. His background was in
accounting. He brought extensive experience structuring real estate
syndications as well as construction and management oversight
experience, a commitment to good financial management, and an ongoing
association with his former top-eight accounting firm.
The new company was very entrepreneurial and the partners started
with very little cash. The company's strategy was to build expertise in
both large scale market rate condominium projects and government
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assisted rental housing.
In the early 1970s, state and federal housing programs presented a
unique opportunity for developers with little cash. Risk was minimal
because loans were non-recourse, and available for 98% of costs. A
developer only had to finance 2% of the project. By utilizing
syndications, a little-known vehicle in 1971, a company could sell
limited partnerships for an additional 20% to 25% of the mortgage
proceeds. FMK thus financed 120% of the costs and created a 20% profit
margin for themselves. In return for the cash, FMK gave its limited
partners tax shelter benefits, a share of project cash flow, and 50% of
the residuals. FMK protected its 50% of the residual with excellent
management and maintenance services because it saw itself as a long-term
equity holder.
In 1974, FMK built Queen Mary's, a 450-unit mixed-income
development. The idea of mixed-income development originated with the
new head of the Massachusetts Housing Finance Agency (MHFA) rather than
FMK, but Queen Mary was the first successful one in Massachusetts.
Building upon Queen Mary's success, FMK won a competition in 1976
to redevelop a failed housing project, King's Road. King's Road was an
eyesore, 80% vacant, with minority tenants. The finished, 400-unit
project surpassed many market-rate developments in terms of amenities,
design quality and beauty. FMK made promises to the minority tenants
and kept them; existing tenants were returned to new apartments. The
development was well maintained and FMK entered a joint venture
partnership with them and applied some of the syndication benefits to
social service programs.
All three partners worked on King's Road and it gave FMK a national
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reputation as a unique firm capable of.revitalizing failed housing
projects. Although projects of this sort are not common in the
industry, FMK has since been offered five similar opportunities of the
same or larger scale.
In FMK's first condominium project, a 150-unit development in a
seashore resort community, the firm applied the same formula of quality
design and quality management. FMK started its construction company
with the objective of having the resort "look like a FMK project."
The resort project was FMK's tuition as a market rate developer,
and profits from the earlier successes with governmen.t assisted housing
saved the company. According to Malloy,
"The condominiums sold like gang busters in 1972, but when
interest rates choked off sales in 1973, we carried fourteen unsold
condominiums for eighteen months and lost over $600,000. We
syndicated Queen Mary and sent the money down to the Cape. We were
only one of two builders on the Cape who didn't go broke in 1973.
We later sold out three more phases down there and we were ahead of
the market."
Although the company had always been open to growth, in 1977 the
partners made a series of decisions that enabled the company to grow to
the national level: FMK expanded its government business to take
advantage of a new federal rental housing program, the section 8
program; FMK expanded regionally, setting up a Mid-Atlantic division and
it developed a centralized financial control center for all the
companies, a service that costs FMK $750,000 in $1987 dollars.
Different partners evaluated the decision to became a national real
estate company differently because being national put a tremendous cash
flow pressure on the company to generate eight million dollars a month
to finance its ongoing construction. It made FMK vulnerable to shifts
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in the economy.
Strengths and Weaknesses: In the early government-assisted deals,
the company did not need to develop a cost-conscious policy as there was
an incentive to inflate the costs in order to increase syndication
benefits. Kendall's familiarity with syndications gave FMK an early
advantage.
While there was always unmet demand for low-income housing, the
ability to meet that demand was limited by the availability of
government subsidies. Because they allocated the subsidies, government
agencies were FMK's early "buyers" and were interested in well-designed,
well-built and well-managed developments which FMK delivered better than
their competition. To produce a high-quality subsidized product, FMK
frequently reinvested part of their profits into the projects. The
firm's philosophy was "even if we make less on each project, we will get
more projects and prosper."
Another "buyer" in government-assisted housing was the tenant's
association, which was often given final say in developer selection by
the governmental authorities. In addition to good management, tenant
groups were interested in developers who would joint venture with them,
sharing syndication proceeds and applying them to tenant services. FMK
fit the bill.
At some point in the early 1970s, the company formed its own
management company to support this development strategy. The management
company was also a profit center, charging FMK a standard 5% fee for its
services.
The construction company served the same strategic purpose--FMK saw
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a competitive advantage in controlling all aspects of construction.
Although construction earned a 6% fee on projects, in fact the
development effort often supported the construction company, paying the
construction fee first to maintain the large bonding capacity of the
construction company. FMK tolerated the need to carry core construction
staff on its payroll in downturns in order to provide a reliably
high-quality product. Any inefficiencies between the FMK construction
price and a market price were monitored by Kendall.
Competitors: FMK relied on market studies for information about
its competitors. Market studies were done on a project-by-project
basis. To avoid overcapacity, FMK chose to build in the New England and
Mid-Atlantic markets where large parcels of land were scarce, and
thereby hoped to eliminate the overbuilding and cut-throat competition
common in faster growing markets like Florida.
FMK beat their competition with their unique mixed-income products.
Therefore, in government-assisted work, FMK maintained a collegial
attitude toward competitors.
Contemplated Exit Decision from Government Assisted Housing
Projects.: FMK did not leave the government assisted rental sector in
the early 1980s when most federal programs were dismantled by the Reagan
administration.
All of the federal housing programs enacted in 1970s had been
harshly criticized in the press as being too expensive. They were very
liberal programs and the country was becoming more conservative. When
President Reagan was elected in 1980, he quickly began to dismantle the
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federal housing bureaucracy; by 1981 the only subsidized units available
were under old programs. "Everyone jumped in to get the last units as
they recycled through the system" (Smith, 1987). There was some
uncertainty as to how successful the president would be with Congress,
but Reagan's landslide victory in 1984 made it crystal clear that the
federal government was out of the housing business. Many firms left
government-assisted housing, including many of the largest New England
rental housing developers.
At the same time pockets, of opportunity remained: rental
development with new state subsidies that replaced federal ones; and
rehabilitation of failed housing projects and HUD distressed housing.
The agency buyers were somewhat price-insensitive because government
entities that owned failed developments needed to act and they needed
positive results.
There were strategic exit barriers for FMK that kept them from
leaving this part of the industry: a loss of corporate image, a loss of
construction work, a loss of ties to government financing agencies, and
a loss of the interrelatedness of FMK's total strategy because it was in
both ends of the large development market.
Also emotional barriers existed for the partners who were
personally identified with the early successful mixed-income projects.
FMK had strengths, and was well positioned to exploit the remaining
pockets of opportunity.
FMK reinvested and took a leadership position in
government-assisted housing by undertaking the Kennedy Point project in
1981 and two other failed housing projects, as well as actively
competing for new state subsidies. FMK created a separate division to
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undertake the work.
As a part of the decision to stay, FMK undertook Kennedy Point, the
company's largest project to date, a 200 million dollar, revitalization
of a 1400-unit failed housing project into luxury mixed-income housing.
FMK's joint venture partner in Kennedy Point was an association of 400
low-income, minority tenants. FMK's investment of 18 million dollars
was a substantial portion of the firm's assets. FMK expected to be
repaid in the future and receive a 6% to 8% profit on total project
costs.
According to Malloy, the decision was made for the following
reasons and without a formal process:
"We really thought it was over in 1981, and we were exploring
becoming a national acquisition and syndication company. We would
have had to make a commitment to be a national company and hire a
lot of people and be on the road. We probed and found out that
becoming a national syndicator was not for us.
Kendall was busy with construction and management. Finnerty
was on the Cape and I didn't want to travel. When Kennedy Point
came along, we got involved in it. Finnerty loved Kennedy Point.
He was from the area and he had been committed to doing something
(positive about Kennedy Point) from the 1960s."
The decision to stay in government-assisted housing was understood
by senior staff as an entirely consistent decision with the past pattern
of decision making:
"The principals at FMK never discussed leaving this segment of
the industry. They always believed that the change in federal
government housing policy was part of a cycle and that the federal
government would come back into housing. They had gone through the
elimination of other federal housing programs in the 1970s and the
sky had not fallen in. They had also become diversified as a
company which in hindsight everyone understands helped tide us
over" (Smith 1987).
Values and Preferences of the principal(s): The values of the
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partners shaped the firm. Those values were: a willingness to work with
government programs in spite of the red tape; a commitment to do
high-quality work for low-income people; a willingness to retain
thirty-three percent low-income people in "luxury" mixed-income
developments; and an interest in holding and maintaining the
developments for the long-run rather than milking them over the
short-run. According to Malloy,
"The firms philosophy was "We can do it better" and we took the
high road. We wanted to establish a good reputation in the
(low-income) field using good architects and good construction
techniques. The first project that we built that we were really
proud of was Queen Mary in 1974. It all started as a commitment to
do something first rate. The project was well located and well
designed. We spent a lot of time picking the color of the brick
and thinking it was a 100 year decision. When the bidding came up
for the failed housing project in 1976 (Kings Road), we weren't
going to get into it. MHFA called up and asked us to enter saying
that the tenant group had been over to see Queen Mary and liked it.
We did and built Kings Road. MHFA was my expertise and we knew we
could do it."
Decisions were also shaped by the partner's preferences.
"Finnerty's background was in market rate housing. He liked market
rate and he liked the Cape. So when he got a call in 1971 asking
if he wanted to buy an old girls camp on the Cape, he went down and
tied it up."
Organizational Structure and the Planning Process: FMK was a
privately held corporation. Finnerty was the president, the major stock
holder and the ultimate decision maker in the firm. Initially, major
responsibilities were divided between the partners; construction and
management became Kendall's responsibility. Malloy was in charge
development, and Finnerty was responsible for the overall direction of
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the firm.
In 1977, the firm hired a treasurer who was responsible for
developing a business plan for the firm, and overseeing its centralized
control system. The treasurer produced a yearly plan which projected
the company's business for three years. It reflected some decisions and
provided the raw information upon which other decisions were made. The
treasurer viewed decision making as continuous and realized that
decisions were not always made for economic reasons.
"Because FMK was privately held, the partners did not have to
answer to shareholders, and financial considerations were not the
first or only criteria upon which decisions were made. Decisions
were made based upon social considerations, reputation, the need
for investment for future growth, and financial reasons" (Lord,
1987).
Malloy left FMK in 1987 to go off on his own to "be a small company
again" (Malloy, 1987). When he left, the company was reorganized; two
development departments were formed, government-assisted housing
projects and private development, and a vice president named for each; a
two-tiered executive committee was set up in which the partners formed
the top tier, and the treasurer, vice president of government-assisted
housing and the vice president of private development formed the second
tier. Decisions were still made by the partners but with the executive
committee playing a part in the formal decision making process. Formal
strategic planning took place during a two-day annual retreat.
FMK's national reputation in mixed-income revitalizations allowed
the firm to recruit an experienced staff from government service that
was politically adept and could deal with the intricacies of rental
housing finance, tax-exempt bond financing, and syndications.
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Evaluation of Strategy
The company had a clearly articulated strategy which guided its
work for twenty years. It was a national firm with a differentiated
mixed-income rental product that was nationally unique; the firm was
active in both large scale market rate planned unit developments and
large scale government-assisted housing in order to be less susceptible
to cycles in either. It remained in rental projects for the long run.
It was integrated into construction, management and syndication to
support its strategy, and was open to growth and willing to put the
necessary infrastructure in place to support growth. FMK found a niche
for itself in the subsidized housing market where it did not have to be
cost-competitive, which is consistent with a differentiation
strategy.
The initial strategy was a product of the vision, experiences,
aesthetic standards and strong sense of social responsibility of the
partners who were able to shape a new industry opportunity to their
"sense of what ought to be." That same sense of values kept FMK in the
public housing field after many of the easier opportunities disappeared
in 1981.
The large scale projects on which the firm started were appropriate
for the professional experiences of the partners. Personal preferences
affected the location of their ventures. The strategy was shared by the
partners, the executive committee and the staff, and was reflected in
their recruitment practices. The dominant decision maker was also the
major stockholder. Decisions seemed to be made on the basis of
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judgement of the partners even though the company systematically
developed analytical and planning materials to inform its decisions.
This may reflect the cognitive preference of the partners. FMK did not
operate from a written strategic plan.
The firm's strategy was proactive and guided the firm to
opportunities. The strategy appeared to be crafted by the decision
makers as they learned from experiences, refining the strategy in the
good times and probing other strategic alternatives in the bad.
The decisions to vertically expand, to take on larger and larger
projects, and to stay in and reinvest in government-assisted housing
rather than exit in 1981, created no discontinuity with previous
strategic decisions; the strategic options that represented
discontinuity were rejected. The firm created a financial
infrastructure to support its strategy and hired additional staff and
reorganized as necessary.
The firm was very successful. Starting without cash, it held a 50%
interest in a very large portfolio of well-maintained and well-managed
rental projects and become one of the largest home building firms in the
country as well. Its early investments were nearing maturity and the
firm looked forward to free and clear ownership of its inventory. It
was able to bear its competitors, and meets its profit expectations.
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Chapter 4 - Analysis of Data
Introduction to the Analysis
In this chapter the data gathered in the case studies is analyzed
through the theoretical lens developed in Chapter 1. It begins by
identifying which firms were successful and asks whether there was
anything in their strategy or strategic process that distinguished them
from the less successful firms and could be construed as a factor
contributing to their success.
In order to compile the data from the cases, 12 matrixes were
developed. (See Appendix E). On the horizontal axis of the matrix are
the five firms in the order in which the cases were presented. Firm 1 is
North Shore Homes; firm 2 is Authentic Homes; firm three is Sullivan and
Smart; firm 4 is the Kimberly Group and firm 5 is FMK. (This order also
ranks them by size beginning with the smallest firm at 15 starts a year,
graduating to 50, 100, 150 and 2000 starts a year in that order). The
horizontal axis lists some of the questions from the case study protocol
found in Appendix C. The matrixes are filled in with answers supplied by
the firms.
The results are summarized in the matrixes below. For purposes of
simplicity, the summary is divided as follows: success of the firm;
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articulation of economic strategy; clarity of values; the strategy
formation process and strategic implementation.
Generally, in the summary, factors were identified that were:
.present only in the successful firms;
.present in all of the firms;
.identified only in the less successful firms;
.not identified in any of the firms.
The companies studied were very diverse. They ranged in size from a
small builder to one of the largest home building companies in the
country; in age from 3 to 40 years old; in sales volume from 6 million to
99 million dollars a year; in employees from 17 to 500, and in project
size from a single unit to a thousand-unit planned-development. The
companies were involved in most aspects of home building: single family
detached, condominiums developments, rehabilitation of older structures,
and syndicated rental projects. The companies served markets that were
local, state-wide, regional, multi-regional, national and multinational.
The companies ~themselves were representative of many organizational forms:
family businesses, professional partnerships, privately held corporations
and publicly traded companies. (Because all of the firms were
headquartered in the Northeast, the large merchant builder was not
studied.) The results were surprisingly clear despite the tremendous
diversity in the firms studied.
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Section 1 -Summary of Results
a. Success of Firms
Three of the five firms, #2 (Authentic Homes), #4 (The Kimberly
Company) and #5 (FMK) were clearly successes in all five categories.
They: made their profit margins; stayed in business; were able to beat
their competition; were able to deliver a quality product; and met their
own business goals. All of the firms were able to hold their own
competitively and deliver a quality product. This level of success seemed
necessary just to stay in business.
The two least successful firms, #1 (North Shore Homes) and #3 (S&S),
experienced profit squeezes and had to bid away profits to maintain
quality and hold their customers. S&S left the industry in favor of its
more profitable primary business, and North Shore Homes maintained
profitability by diversifying out of home building, and was considering
leaving the industry entirely.
SUCCESS MATRIX 1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th
firm firm firm firm firm
Criteria for Success
made profit margins squeezed yes seldom should yes
... still in business deciding yes no yes yes
... beat competition held own yes held own yes yes
...delivered quality product yes yes yes yes yes
... met business goals no yes no yes yes
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b. Clear and Articulated Economic Strategy
The three successful firms had a clear and internally consistent
generic strategy, focused by buyer, product, and market. All three
focused on buyers who were relatively price-insensitive (i.e., high-income
buyers, renters, and government agencies who sponsored low-income housing,
respectively). Two of the firms achieved unique products, and the third
tried to differentiate its rental product in terms of quality and
sensitivity to the buyer. Authentic Homes had a local market, the
Kimberly Group a'regional market, and FMK a national market, but with a
concentration in two contiguous regions.
The two less successful firms had strategic problems. North Shore
Homes attempted a focused, cost-leadership strategy, and tried to serve
the more price sensitive buyer by staying flexible, small and local. That
generic strategy proved difficult to achieve when land, labor, materials,
and regulatory costs rose higher than buyers' incomes. North Shore Homes
was currently attempting to switch to a higher income buyer with a more
differentiated pr'oduct, but was trading away profits to attract them. FMK
got stuck-in-the-middle, attempting to be a volume producer of luxury
housing. They ended up trading away profits to produce a luxury finish on
a production schedule, and did not achieve the high margins of smaller
luxury builders.
All of the companies delivered quality products, and had
entrepreneurial ability. None of the firms articulated their strategy
through a formal strategic planning process. Vertical integration
generally complemented the firm's core generic strategic choices.
It was interesting to note that while all of the firms expanded
79
capacity, only one made a clear strategic choice to grow. We found that
only one firm analyzed its competitors, and that none developed competitor
profiles.
1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th
ECONOMIC STRATEGY firm firm firm firm firm
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Components of Strategy
... written strategic plan no no no no no
-------------------------------------------------------
... clear and internally
generic strategy no yes no yes yes
-------------------------------------------------------
... quality & attention
to detail yes yes yes yes yes
-------------------------------------------------------
... entrepreneurial hustle yes yes yes yes yes
------------------------------------------------------
Strategy Chosen focused focused stuck-in- focused focused
middle
. . .price-policy cost-lead unique diff. diff. unique
... customers were
price-insenitive no yes no yes yes
... market local local state regional national
-----------------------------------------------------
Strategy Problem lost stuck-in
low-end middle
market custom/volume
-----------------------------------------------------
Were Other Strategic Decisions Consistent With Generic Strategy
... vertical integration yes & no yes yes yes yes
... capacity expansion na na na na yes
o----------------------------------
Analyze Competitors no no no yes no
-----------------------------------------------------
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c. Clarifying Values
The futurists claimed that firms would be able to develop more
proactive and creative strategies by clarifying their values, and
developing their sense of mission. In all of the firms, the strategies
chosen reflected the founders' values and professional experiences,
although to different degrees. Two of the successful firms, Authentic
Homes and FMK, had the most clearly defined values and sense of mission.
Both of the firms developed unique products (authentic Georgian homes and
high-quality, low and mixed-income housing, respectively) which flowed
from the founders' values, and both had a process for renewing those
values from time to time. In the third successful firm, the Kimberly
Group, the founders had a cognitive preference for "good business
practices," and their creative strategy flowed from these values and their
mastery of the field.
The successful firms allowed some room for experimentation or
rehearsal, both through probing the market and by starting with a
prototype later copied at a larger scale.
We found that there was a dominant decision maker in all of the
firms. We found a shared strategy in all but one firm, S&S, and we found
that S&S's exit from the home building industry flowed from a lack of
enthusiasm for home building and a shared opinion that involvement in home
building was detracting from the firm's primary business. Having a shared
strategy may be a necessary factor for success.
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The successful firms were all proactive. It is interesting to note
that one of the less successful firms, #3, S&S was also proactive.
1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th
CLARIFYING VALUES firm firm firm firm firm
------------------------------------------------------------------
Was There a
... dominant decision maker yes yes yes yes yes
----------------------------------------------------
... shared strategy yes yes no yes yes
-------------------------------------------------------
Did the Strategy Reflect
... decision maker's exp. yes yes yes yes yes
-------------------------------------------------------
... decision maker's values yes yes yes yes yes
-------------------------------------------------------
Were Values Clarified
was strategy proactive no yes yes yes yes
... was strategy creative no yes no yes yes
... was product unique no yes no no yes
... experimentation built in no yes no yes yes
-------------------------------------------------------
d. The Strategic Decision Making Process
The examination of the decision making process was guided by the
incrementalists who claimed that strategy was better explained with the
metaphor of crafting, or muddling through, than with the metaphor of a
deliberate planning process as claimed by the early rational, classical
strategic planners. The cases showed that no firms used a strategic
planning process; and that all of the firms crafted their strategy through
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knowledge of their industry, experience, probing the market, and using
soft data.
The three successful firms used more analytical data in their
decisions than the other firms. However, only the Kimberly group
systematically used analytical data, as well as judgement, in its decision
making.
The results showed that all of the firms exercised strategic
discipline, and did not chase opportunities too far afield from their
chosen focus once their basic strategy was locked in. Only the British
multinational that bought Authentic Homes seemed to lack strategic
discipline. The case studies showed that only at crisis points, when the
old strategy showed signs of crumbling, did the firms seem to reconsider
their basic strategy and look in entirely new directions.
1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th
REALISTIC STRATEGIC PROCESS firm firm firm firm firm
------------------------------------------------------------------
Was Strategy formulated through
... strategic planning no no no no no
process
-------------------------------------------------------
soft data yes yes yes yes yes
-------------------------------------------------------
... analytical material no yes no yes yes
-------------------------------------------------------
... knowledge/experience yes yes yes yes yes
----------- ---------------------------------------------
... probing market yes yes yes yes yes
-------------------------------------------------------
... identified opportunity yes yes yes yes yes
-------------------------------------------------------
Basis of Decisions
... judgement yes yes yes yes yes
... and analysis no no no yes no
Exercise----------------------------------
Exercised S. Discipline yes yes yes yes yes
-------------------------------------------------------
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e. Strategic Implementation
While strategic implementation was not included in the theoretical
framework in the literature review in Chapter 1, the cases raised the
issue. All three successful firms put an infrastructure in place to
support their strategy; they clearly designated responsibility and
authority, and later developed a recruitment policy to support it.
Generally, the successful firms recruited on the basis of their
strategy: Authentic Homes recruited people interested in Georgian and
Victorian design, the Kimberly Group recruited people from the top
professional schools and firms, and FMK recruited people from the public
sector with good finance or political skills.
Good financial controls were instituted by the larger companies, and
were more a function of size than an overall determinant of successful
strategic implementation.
1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th
IMPLEMENTATION firm firm firm firm firm
------------------------------------------------------------------
Strategy Reflected In
... infrastructure yes yes no yes yes
... recruitment policy no yes no yes yes
-------------------------------------------------------
... anticipated risks no yes no yes yes
DevelpedFne----------------------------------
Developed Financial Controls no no yes yes yes
-------------------------------------------------------
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Section 2 - Other Findings
Capital Investment and Accumulation. At inception, only one of the
firms, the Kimberly Group, had access to capital. In 1987, all of the
firms had accumulated capital and developed equity positions in some of
their projects. (Matrix 1 & 2, Appendix E.)
Preference and Organization. All of the founders had professional
roots in the building trades or the real estate business, and in all firms
except one, the founders' preferences and sense of civic responsibility
affected the strategy of the firm. All of the firms (except the British
Multinational) were privately held firms which generally allow a freer
rein to preference. (Matrix 4, Appendix E.)
Strategy Formation Process. All of the firms had dominant decision
makers who were generally, but not always, the majority partners.
Additional strategic input came from other partners and executive
committee members. Whenever there was more than one partner, or an
executive committee, decisions were negotiated by means of discussion. No
firms had planning departments or used consultants to help prepare
strategic plans. Only one firm, the largest, had instituted yearly
strategic retreats. The three largest firms used market studies and
financial projections to make decisions, and the largest firm used a
three-year business plan as well. Generally, the inputs into decision
making became more formal and analytical as the firms grew larger. (Matrix
4, Appendix E.)
Focused Strategies. All of the firms were focused by buyers, aiming
at a mid-to-high-end buyers. Four of the firms had focused markets. The
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fifth firm was nominally nation-wide, but only had offices in two
contiguous regions. Location was partially determined by personal
preferences (travel-time and life style) of the principals. All of the
firms attempted a differentiation strategy. This may be the result of
choosing firms headquartered in the Northeast region, where land,
materials, labor and regulatory effects were very expensive. A different
region might have shown more variety in focused strategies. (Matrix 5,
Appendix E.)
Competitors. Two of the firms were worried about new entrants into
home building. The smallest builder worried about the
carpenter-turned-builder who experienced no real entry barriers, and the
newest multifamily builder was worried about potential national
competitors coming in with cash to scale the high entry barriers in the
Northeast. Two of the firms had the luxury of having triumphed over their
competition and therefore having only a few, stable current competitors.
Only one firm knew more about their competitors than some of their
names, current projects and capabilities. The firms generally did not
know their competitors' intentions, financial results, goals or
vulnerabilities. None of the firms worried about competitor retaliation,
although most were worried about overbuilding. The smaller builders
monitored overbuilding by knowing the local markets' absorption potential
very well, and the larger builders supplemented personal knowledge with
professional, in-house market studies. All of the firms felt that being
in the Northeast was a good brake on regional overcapacity because land
was scarce and expensive. (Matrix 6, Appendix E.)
Risk Profiles. All of the firms, except the smallest, took market
risk and built on speculation. All took some financial risk, although
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generally not for an extended period of time. Land banking was seen by
all as very risky, and even the firm with the highest risk profile would
not get highly leveraged on land. Joint venturing was a function of size;
the larger firms joint ventured and the smaller firms did not.
The smaller firms were generally looking for larger profit margin,
than the larger firms who seemed to be trading volume for margin. (Matrix
6, Appendix E.)
Vertical Integration. All of the firms that integrated vertically
received both an economic benefit and a strategic benefit. Most of the
firms incurred some administrative costs and had to monitor
inefficiencies. Generally, the decision to integrate seemed more
strategic than economic, and was generally done to pursue a
differentiation strategy. (Matrix 8, Appendix E.)
Entry into Industry. Firms generally entered the industry (and new
markets) with advantages and new products. They did not expect
retaliation. Only the newest firm encountered high entry barriers which
it used to its advantage. The only entry that was not profitable was
based on an erroneous assumption about the similarity of the commercial
real estate sector and the home building industry. (Matrix 9, Appendix
E.)
Capacity Expansion. Although all of the firms grew, only one made a
conscious decision to be open to growth. The major component of their
decision to grow was to put in place a centralized system of financial
controls rather than engage in the systematic analysis of competitors'
capacity recommended by the competitive strategists. (Matrix 10, Appendix
E.)
Acquisition Decision. There was only one acquisition decision in the
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cases. Acquisition of home builders was rare. The acquisition (Authentic
Homes) was profitable for the buyer because the seller, who had
non-economic reasons to sell, undervalued the company.
(Matrix 11, Appendix E.)
Exit Decisions Contemplated. All of the firms except the youngest
firm had contemplated exit decisions. Authentic Homes and North Shore
Homes found new niches for themselves in periods of decline within the
remaining pockets of demand in the industry. Authentic Homes prospered
and North Shore Homes was still contemplating exit. FMK reinvested
during a period of decline and took an leadership position in the
industry. S&S's and Authentic Home's owners left the industry for
non-economic reasons during good times. Even in times of decline,
preference seems to play a large role in exit decisions. principals who
wanted to leave, left; and principals who wanted to stay, stayed and found
a remaining pocket of demand to work within. Generally, the industry was
easy to leave. (Matrix 12, Appendix E.)
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Chapter 5
Conclusions
Having a clear, articulated and internally consistent generic business
strategy is a distinct competitive advantage in the home building
industry. Coherent business unit strategies distinguish the successful
from the unsuccessful firms in the home building industry. The firms that
have clear generic strategies are able to remain profitable while firms
without a coherent generic strategy are unable to hold their customers and
negotiate with suppliers without bidding away their profits. This is true
regardless of size of the firm, initial access to capital, or industry
segment. An articulated economic strategy helps firms become and stay
profitable, beat their competition, meet internal business goals, and
avoid serious blunders, despite serious problems in the home building
industry.
Business unit strategies once formulated do not need constant
revision, although they need to be updated from time to time. Strategies
among the successful firms were locked in early. These firms experienced
periods of strategic stability, when strategic implementation was more
important to the firms' successes than new strategy formation. Updating
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and revising of strategies usually happens in the home building industry
during the down side of industry cycles.
Clarifying values gives firms a competitive advantage in the home
building industry by helping firms achieve a differentiation strategy and
develop products that are perceived by buyers as unique and for which
buyers will pay higher prices. This holds true for firms that are
attempting a national or local differentiation strategy. Firms in which
the principals have clarified their values are able to utilize their sense
of "the future as they would like it to be" to develop creative products
and creative strategies. This is especially important because it is
difficult to create the name identification necessary for differentiation
in the home building industry. Firms with clarified values can
proactively lead the market with their products, because their products
flow from their values, rather than from trend data available to everyone
in the industry. The values that inspire the strategies are not easily
copied, and neither are the strategies. Additionally, some customer
loyalty is established because the clarification of values (when
communicated to customers) helps establish the integrity of the company
and its products.
A formal strategic planning process which requires a planning
staff and a written strategic plan, is not a necessary factor for the
strategic success of a firm. The strategy formation and decision making
process in the firms studied tended to be informal and ad hoc. The
informal process did not detract from the successful firms' ability to
develop, or evolve a clear and internally consistent generic strategy.
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Most of the strategic processes in the case studies built in learning from
experience, experimentation, and reliance on the informed judgement of a
single decision maker. It would be fascinating to delve further into this
topic.
There is a competitive advantage for firms that infuse the informal
and ad hoc strategic decision process with good technical data and
analytical information. Good analytical and technical information and
analysis can make decisions more strategic by supplying decision makers
with information that accurately predict future demand, future moves of
competitors, future costs, new preference trends, and help firms
understand industry trends more quickly. Good analytical information is
especially important for firms that are not able to achieve product
differentiation and need to quickly understanding industry trends to focus
their products to a specific buyer, or to a local market. To be
effective, analytical information does not necessarily need to be written
because decision makers typically respond better to verbal information.
Firms do not need comprehensive written industry analyses, complete
competitor profiles or written strategic plans before they can act, but
they need to learn to systematically gather the information that goes into
these analyses and think about it strategically. Written industry
analyses, competitor profiles, and five-year written strategic plans can
take an ongoing firm years to produce even where the firm has good access
to data.
In reality, this kind of comprehensive analysis is more than the
lean, opportunity based firms in the home building industry can or will do
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-before starting a venture. This analysis requires rigerous planning
before any probing could undertaken, and could be a straight jacket that
prevents a firm from learning from its own experiences. On the other
hand, merely jumping in, without any parts of a plan in place to be
tested, and relying entirely on experience could lead to disaster.
Somewhere inbetween these two extremes is a more realistic planning
process and a more appropriate mix of learning and analysis. But how much
analysis a firm needs, given the cognitive preference of the decision
makers and the size of the firm, is the topic of another thesis.
Aggressively pursuing opportunities and paying close attention to
details will not give firms a competitive advantage in the home building
industry. The home building industry is an opportunity-based industry and
all of the industry leaders value entrepreneurial talent. It is very
seductive to believe that being opportunistic, delivering a quality
product and mastering operating details is a sufficient strategy, but it
is not. If "hustle" were a substitute for a clear generic strategy, all
of the firms we studied would have been successful. But the analysis
showed that they were not. The less successful firms were less
competitive because they vigorously pursued unclear and muddled
strategies. In order to make a profit and beat the competition, the
decisions makers in the home building industry need to be both strategic
and entrepreneurial.
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Appendix A
Components of an Industry Analysis
Industry analysis was Porter's starting point in that he thought
that the viability of the company's whole industry was as important to a
company's success as the company's own strategic position. Porter
attempted to capture the richness of the industries and developed what
he called the five fundamental forces in industry competition which
together determined the strength of competition in an industry and the
industries profitability. The factors were were; threat of entry,
intensity of rivalry among existing competitors, pressure from
substitute products, bargaining power of buyers, bargaining power of
suppliers and government as a sixth force affecting the other five.
Porter distinguished the forces of competition from the many
short-run factors that could affect the profitability of all the firms
in an industry, like fluctuations in the business cycle or material
shortages. The major technological, physical, economic, social, and
political changes were discussed in the context of the fundamental
competitive factors and not treated separately.
Porter focused industry analysis on competitive forces because
increased competition worked to drive down the rate of return on
invested capital until it reached a floor rate of return below which
investors would not invest. The more competitive an industry was,
therefore, the lower its profitability was and its attractiveness to
investment. In a perfectly competitive industry, the rate of return was
approximately the yield on long-term governmental securities adjusted
upward by the risk of capital loss.
93
Appendix B
Identification of the Major Strategic Decisions
Occurring in Industry
Vertical integration was described as the creation of
technologically distinct production, distribution, selling or other
economic processes within the confines of a single firm. Vertical
integration involved a decision by the firm to utilize an internal or
administrative transaction rather than a market transaction to
accomplish its economic purposes. For a firm to find the strategically
appropriate level of vertical integration involved a balancing of the
economic and competitive advantages of vertical integration with the
economic and administrative costs of adding a new process.
Capacity expansion involved a decision to commit resources far
into the future based on specific expectations of future demand and
future competitor behavior. The strategic issue in capacity expansion
was described as how to add capacity to further the objectives of the
firm in hopes of improving competitive position and market share while
avoiding industry overcapacity. Overcapacity was described as most
problematic in industries like real estate where demand is cyclical and
products are not differentiated.
Entry into a new business was described as occurring through
internal development or acquisition. The economics of entry rest on
fundamental market forces. If market forces are working perfectly, in
an economic sense, no entry decision can yield an above-average returns
because the new entrant must invest more than incumbents to overcome
entry barriers and meet the retaliation of incumbents. Therefore, a
successful entry strategy requires finding a market situation where the
firm has special advantages, the industry is in disequilibrium, and
ineffectual retaliation is expected from existing firms.
Entry through acquisition has different economics because
acquisition does not add a new firm to the industry. The critical point
in the acquisition decision was that the price for an acquisition was
set in the market. An efficient market worked to eliminate any above
average profits from acquisitions because a seller would set his or her
price based upon the expected value of continuing to operate the
business. A successful acquisition strategy required that the buyer has
a chance of earning above-average returns on its investment through
adding value to the acquired company, buying in an imperfect market, or
identifying a seller who has set a low expected value on continuing to
operate the business.
The decision to exit an industry usually came as a result of
shrinking profit margins in an industry that was experiencing a decline
in sales over a long time. In the situation of decline, a firm had a
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strategic decision to make: to exit quickly; to exit slowly and harvest
the company; to take a leadership position in the industry and to
reinvest to seek a profitable niche. The decision to leave should
include a determination that the firm was weak relative to the demand
that remained; weak relative to its competitors; that there was no
profitable way to continue and that the exit barriers were low.
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Appendix C
Interview Protocol
1. Company Description
.What is the name of your company?
.What year was your firm founded?
.What market areas do you build in?
.How many countries, states, counties do you do business in?
.How many employees do you have?
.How many starts and finished do you have a year?
.What is your sales volume?
.What are the most important operations of your firm?
.What aspects of the home building industry are you involved in?
.What non-residential development activities are you involved in (i.e.
engineering architecture, construction, interior design, sales, law,
land development, banking, syndications)?
2. Organization of the Firm
.How is your firm presently organized? If a partnership, how many
partners? If a corporation, how many shareholders? If a subsidiary of
another firm, please describe it?
.Have you been involved in joint venture deals? With whom?
3. History of the Firm
.How old is your firm?
.How large was it at inception?
.How many employees did it have at inception?
.If the firm did not have its origins in home building; which industry
did it start in and when did it enter home building?
.What market(s) did the firm start in and with what products?
.How many starts and finishes a year did they do in the early years?
4. Founders of the Firm and Current Operating Head
.Who were the founders?
.What was their background?
.What did they want to do and what were their values?
.What were the social pressures they might have been responding to when
they started the firm?
.Is the operating head of the firm a salaried executive or owner?
.What is the age and sex of the operating head of the firm?
.What is the formal education of the operating head of the firm?
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.Is the spouse or another family member of the operating head employed
by the firm?
.What is the employment and professional background of the operating
head of the firm?
.What specific beliefs or values does the operating head of the firm
have that have affected the direction of the firm?
5. Multinational Owner
.What are the current results (sales growth, rate of return) of the
corporate parent?
.What are the overall goals of the corporate parent?
.What strategic importance does the parent attach to the particular
business unit in terms of its overall corporate strategy? .Why did the
parent get into the business and what does this say about the pressure
the parent will place on the business units strategic posture and
behavior?
.What is the economic relationship between the business and others in
the parent company's portfolio in terms of vertical integration,
complementarity to other businesses, and shared R&D ?
.What are the corporate-wide values or beliefs of top management? For
example, do they seek technological leadership in all their businesses,
no-layoff policies?
.Is there a generic strategy that the parent has applied to a number of
businesses and may attempt to apply to this one?
.Given the performance and needs of other units in the corporation and
the overall corporate strategy, what sorts of sales targets, hurdles
for return on investment and constraints on capital are likely to be
placed on the business unit?
.What are the parent company's diversification plans?
.What clues does the parent's corporate structure provide about the
relative status, position and goals of the unit in the eyes of the
parent? i.e. how powerful is the part of the corporation the business
unit reports too?
.How is the divisional management controlled and compensated in the
overall corporate scheme?
.What kinds of executives seem to have been rewarded by the corporate
parent, as an indication of the types of strategic behavior reinforced
by the corporation?
.Does the corporation as a whole have any regulatory, antitrust or
social sensitivity which to affect the business?
.Does the corporate parent or particular top management have an
emotional attachment to the unit?
6. Strengths and Weaknesses
.What does your firm do uniquely well?
.What kinds of resources does your firm have in people and money?
.Where is your firm weak?
7. Strategic Decision Making Process
.What process does the company use in making key strategic decisions?
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.Who is involved in the decisions?
.How formal is that process?
.Does the company have a strategic plan and if so who produces it?
.What information does the company use in its planning?
.How disciplined is the company about following a strategic plan once
adopted?
8. Competitor Analysis
.Who are your closest competitors?
.Who are the likely potential competitors?
.What do you know about the recent history of your competitors?
.Have new firms entered the industry recently?
.What is your attitude toward competitors?
.Does anyone in your company collect data on your competitors?
.What data do you collect?
.What information about your competitors do you use when you formulate
strategy?
.Are you competing with a stable set of competitors or do they change
with every project?
.What types of strategies have worked or not worked for your competitors
in the past?
.What are their current strategies?
.What are their capabilities?
.Where are they vulnerable? How would they respond to provocation?
.How effectively can they retaliate?
9. Generic Strategy
.What products do you sell?
.What services do you sell?
.At how many steps is value added to your product?
.Do you aim for the low-cost position in the industry?
.If not, what is your firm's cost position?
.Who are your buyers?
.What is your relationship to your buyers?
.How do you determine what your buyers want and value?
.Do your products have a distinctive architectural style, a distinctive
level of quality?
.Are any of your products unique in the industry?
.Are all of your products similarly affected by price, quality and style
changes?
.Do you have different markets for your products?
.Do you have different competitors for different products?
.Could you sell off any part of your business separately?
.How does your strategy aid you in your relationship with buyers,
suppliers, substitute products, rivals?
.Is there a set of policies against which you evaluate opportunities?
.How have those policies evolved overtime?
.How much do the preferences and values of the principles affect which
opportunities you select?
10. Risk Analysis
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.What are the critical factors for success in your business?
.How would you weigh them?
.In terms of internal factors, how do you evaluate yourself against your
nearest competitor?
.How would you forecast the trends for each external factor?
.What risks is your company comfortable taking?
.What risks will you not take?
11. Strategic Decisions:
.How has the company evolved over the years?
.Has the company made a decision(s) that substantially refocused the
corporate energies: has the company gone into different markets; been
involved in forward or backward integration; substantially expanded
capacity; diversified out of the industry; left the home building
industry; entered another part of the industry through internal
development or acquisition?
.How did your firm respond to the market downturns in 1974 and 1981?
.What, if anything, did you do differently to protect yourself after
those cycles?
.How has your firm responded to changes in information technology,
banking, construction technology, demographics, changes in federal
monetary policy, increased regulatory processes, increased price of
land,.the volatility in interest rates and the cost of capital?
12. Acquisition Decisions
.How did you find the company you bought?
.Did you buy through a broker?
.Was it on the market?
.What kind of information did you gather about the company?
.How did you pick the region of the country?
.What was the price position of the company?
.What was its relationship to customers and what they value?
.Was the company undervalued?
.How was the value of the company determined?
.Were there imperfections in the market that affected the price?
.Did the seller have superior information?
.Was the number of bidders low?
.Were the conditions in the economy bad?
.Was the company sick?
.Did the seller have objectives besides maximizing the price received?
.Did the owner have a special reason to sell, i.e., did he/she need
capital, did he/she have estate problems, had he/she lost key members
of management, did he have weak management?
.Did the purchaser have an acquisitions policy?
.What was it?
.How did the purchaser make the decision to enter the home building
industry?
.Did the purchaser conduct an overall industry attractiveness analysis?
.What did the purchaser want in the company?
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.Were there any issues of the values of the buying company that
particularly affect this purchase?
.What unique abilities did the buyer's bring to the acquisition
candidate that let the firm outbid other firms?
.Did it have a base from which to change the industry structure?
.Did the acquisition uniquely help the buyer's position in its existing
business irrespective of profits?
.How successful was the acquisition for the company?
.Did they make above average profit margins?
.Was there any evidence that the buyer was acting irrationally?
.Did they target a specific strategic grouping in the industry?
.Was this the buyer's first acquisiton in the industry?
.What other acquisitions did they make?
.What did they do differently in subsequent acquisitions?
.Did they sequence their entry into the industry in one group and then
go from group to group?
13. Entry through Internal Development
.How did the firm identify the target industry for internal entry?
.Was the industry in disequilibrium?
.Did the firm have special advantages?
.Did the firm have lower entry costs than other firms?
.Did the firm have distinctive abilities to influence the industry
structure?
.Were there expected-positive effects on the firm's existing
businesses?
.Was it a new industry, or a new industry segment?
.Did the industry or segment have rising entry barriers indicating that
future profits will more than offset future costs of entry?
.Was there poor public information about opportunities in the industry?
.Was the market sending off signals to others to induce their entry as
well?
.Could the firm overcome structural entry barriers more cheaply then
other entrants, or did it expect less retaliation because of its assets,
skills, or innovation?
.Did the firm have distinctive ability to influence industry structure,
(for example, increasing consolidation in a fragmented industry)?
.What investments did the firm need to make in the new business?
.What entry barriers did the entrant confront?
.What, if any, additional investment was required to overcome the
structural barriers to entry?
.What effect, if any, did the firms entry have on the supply-demand
balance in the industry?
.What was the expected cost of retaliation from industry incumbents?
.Did the entry have the expected positive effects on the firm's other
businesses?
.How do the costs above balance against the expected cash flows?
.Did the conditions for retaliation exist (slow growth, a commodity like
product, high fixed costs, high industry concentration, incumbents who
attach high strategic importance to being in the industry or had a
prior history of retaliation)?
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.Was slow or ineffectual retaliation from incumbents expected?
.Did retaliation occur?
.What was the firms generic concept for entry (i.e. reduced product
costs, buy in with low price, forego returns in the short run to force
competitors to yield share, offer a superior product, discover a new
niche, or introduce a market innovation)?
.Was the entry successful?
14. Exit Decisions
.Is or was the industry or industry segment experiencing decline in
absolute numbers over a sustained period of time as opposed to a short
run-cycle?
.Was there uncertainty in the industry about whether demand would
continue to decline?
.How volatile was the rivalry in the industry?
.What was the cause of decline?
.What was the structure of the remaining pockets of demand?
.Did the remaining pockets of demand involve price-insensitive buyers or
those that had little bargaining power?
.Were there any exit barriers for the company (i.e., the existence of
durable specialized assets; fixed costs; strategic exit costs including
corporate image, interrelatedness to the total strategy, access to
financial markets, vertical integration; information barriers;
managerial or emotional barriers; and government and social
barriers)?
.Was the industry favorable to decline in terms of low exit barriers and
low uncertainty?
.Did the firm have strengths that enabled it to stay in the industry?
.Did the firm "need" to stay in the business?
.What exit strategy did the company pursue (exit strategies are defined
as investing or seeking a leadership position in terms of market share
of the firms that remain; seeking a niche that will maintain high
demand and allow high returns; harvesting the business by curtailing
new investment but reaping the benefits of past good will; and/or
divesting quickly by selling early in the decline.
.Did the firm fail to recognize the decline, fall into a war of
attrition with competitors or try to harvest the company without clear
strengths
15. Vertical Integration
.Did you decide to go into land development, form a construction
company, build a design staff, form a brokerage or sales force, form a
management company, form an interior design company, buy a bank ?
.When did you make that decision?
.Had you bought those services before?
.Were the principal components of that decision strategic or financial?
.What were the direct and indirect benefits to your firm of being
vertically integrated?
.What were the costs in terms of additional administrative and
management burdens?
.How did you balance the costs and benefits to find the strategically
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appropriate extent of vertical integration for your firm?
.How consistent was the decision to vertically integrate with your
overall strategy?
.Did your firm adopt a policy of tapered integration by producing some
of its own requirements internally and contracting for the rest?
.Did your firm adopt a policy of quasi integration, using debt or equity
investments and other means to create alliances between vertically
related firms without full ownership?
.Do you sell any of these services on the market?
.Are there any diseconomies of integration?
.How do you monitor the diseconomies?
16. Capacity Expansion Decisions
.What were the realistic options available to the firm?
.What.degree of vertical integration did they entail?
.Did you estimate future demand, input costs and technological changes?
.How cyclical is the demand in the industry?
.Did you estimate what capacity each of your competitors might add?
.Did you forecast how and when each of your competitors might add
capacity? Did you add the aggregate the industry capacity and the
individual market shares of industry participants, and balance this
capacity against expected demand?
.How did you estimate demand?
.How differentiated are the products in your industry?
.How differentiated are your products from those of your competitors?
17. Evaluation of Strategy
Clarity
.Was there a strategy?
.Was there a strategic plan to gain competitive advantage or did the
firm gain advantage by concentrating on operating details and
doing things well and moving fast?
.Did the firm evaluate its comptitiors?
.Was the strategy clear explicitly or- implicitly?
.Was the strategy shared?
.Was there a dominant decision maker?
.How were strategic decisions made (i.e. on the basis of analysis,
judgement, or the preferences of the decision makers)?
Values
.Did the strgategy reflect the background of the decision makers?
.Did it reflect ths values, ethics, aesthetiacs, preferences and sense
of social responsibility of the key decision makers?
Planning or Crafting
.Did the strategy fully exploit environmental opportunity?
.What was the role of strategic planning, values, probing crafting and
entropreneurial hustle in strategy formation?
.Was the strategy reactive to changes in the business environment or did
it proactively create new opportunity for the company
Continuity or Drastic Change
.Was the strategy consistant with the previous strategy, and past and
present coprorate resources and capabilities?
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.If continuous and consistant, the organizational infrastructure put in
place to execute the strategy?
.If discontinuous with the previous strategy, how did the company handle
the higher risk of a new strategy and did they allow for
experimentation?
.How often were major strategic decisions made and in response to what
events?
What Was the Outcome?
103
Appendix D
Case Study 2: Acquisition Decision of the
Multinational Buyer of Authentic Homes
Description of the Multi-National Owner: McUsher was a British
company in heavy construction and minerals. They entered home building
through acquisition in England in 1981 (Gray, 1985, pp. 145-150).
McUsher was a blue-chip, well-known company in England, and the chairman
of the board was on friendly terms with the Queen. The company
experienced a 22% growth rate and a 5% before-tax profit in 1986.
The company had a corporate goal of investing 50% of its assets in
the U.S. In 1980, McUsher had divested its interests in South Africa
and reinvested the money in the U.S. It was looking for a steady stream
of profits to replace its South African returns. The chairman of the
board attached great strategic significance to its entry into the
American market. Because England is such a small country, the chairman
saw the U.S. as a place in which to grow. He was impressed by the high
regard in which business was held in the U.S. One indication of the
chairman's interest in America was the fact that he personally reviewed
the American portfolio. However, the company was not accustomed to
doing business in the U.S. Despite their discomfort, the top personnel
in the U.S. were British with the exception of an American treasurer.
By 1986, McUsher had acquired six companies on the east coast and
had three American divisions: minerals, construction and home building.
Home building was by far the most profitable division, accounting for
less than 25% of their investment and more than 40% of their profit.
Authentic Homes was the most profitable company in the McUsher
portfolio. There were no economic relationships between Authentic Homes
and other companies in the home building portfolio in terms of vertical
integration, or shared R&D.
McUsher wanted to be located in New England which was a slowly
increasing market, unlike Florida or California. They were interested
in additional acquisitions in the North East and North Central regions
because they were close to England. The British company generally kept
the existing management in both its British and American acquisitions
and phased in their own controls. They were looking for a
twenty-percent yearly growth rate and return on investment. The British
parent required the business unit managers to bid against each other for
capital which it loaned below prime. Aggressive unit managers seemed to
be favored by the emphasis on growth.
McUsher's Acquisition Decisions: Authentic Homes was contacted
through a third party. McUsher viewed Authentic Homes as a local
company with a good reputation and a good product. McUsher wanted the
reputation and quality image in order to be able to make a public stock
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or debt offering and they liked New England.
The company was not on the market. McUsher had a policy against
buying companies that were for sale because they tend to be over-valued.
Representatives of McUsher visited Authentic Homes. They spent $125,000
on an audit. They thought that the products were under-priced due to a
lack of market information and a clear pricing policy. They felt
accounting was the only area in which Authentic Homes was weak.
By McUsher's standards, Authentic Homes was completely undervalued. The
value of the company was based on the inventory and good will.
The "low" value set on the company by Miller was influenced by his
belief that there was no market for home building companies. There were
no other bidders. McUsher felt that it had better information than
Miller about the company finances. It placed more value on the company
than Miller did and was easily able to meet his asking price.
McUsher's acquisition policy in 1983 was: to acquire in industries
they knew; to not enter flashy areas of the U.S. like Florida or
California; and to prefer family-owned businesses because of the
personal effort invested. Authentic Homes met its criteria and the
price was right.
McUsher had not performed an analysis of the attractiveness of the
home building industry in the United States. It relied on the opinions
of its Board members gathered in part from reading the international
coverage in British newspapers and from what they had learned from their
holdings in the U.S.
McUsher felt that it could increase Authentic Homes' efficiency by
installing better accounting and tracking systems as well as by adding
money. McUsher wanted to retain Authentic Homes' management and
structured the purchase as a phased buy-out to accomplish that goal.
The acquisition was also intended to help McUsher by increasing the
value of its stock on the London stock exchange.
The acquisition of Authentic Homes was very successful for McUsher.
They paid Miller out in two years instead of four and showed a 22%
profit. Their stock value in England increased by 50% due to the
American acquisitions. Acquisition of Authentic Homes was an economic
decision for McUsher and made according to their acquisition policy.
McUsher had not targeted a specific strategic grouping in the home
building industry for acquisition but seemed to be learning as it went.
Authentic Homes was McUsher's first acquisition in the Home Building
industry.
McUsher had been involved in one other real estate acquisition in
the U.S. before Authentic Homes. In the early 1980s, the British
company the owner of an exclusive time share project on Marco Island in
Florida. They entered into this project as a joint venture partner and
a lender. The project faltered and they became the owner through -
foreclosure. In 1986, after the infusion of substantial capital and
after a delay of several years the project begun to show a small profit.
McUsher's second home building acquisition was handled by the
Treasurer of the American Division. They bought B&K Homes, an
aggressive young company with a small inventory and a good reputation in
1986. The president was a very innovative and aggressive
thirty-seven-year-old man who wanted to be the biggest builder in the
Northeast. B&K was noted for its flexibly; it efficiently built for
both the low-end or mid market, and was willing to go anywhere. McUsher
105
bought B&K as a growth vehicle.
McUsher seemed to change strategies in 1986. They abandoned the
idea of a public stock offering and therefore, valued Authentic Homes'
reputation less. Rather than a steady stream of profits from Authentic
Homes, McUsher wanted growth and name recognition in the U.S. and pushed
their affiliates to feature the McUsher name more prominently.
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Appendix E
Case Summary Matrixes 1-13
Summary Matrix 1
Company History: At Inception
1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th
firm firm firm firm firm
---------------- -------------------------------------------------
Year Founded 1974 1947 1965 1984 1971
---------------------------------------------------------------------
Year Entered Home Building same same 1970 same same
---------------------------------------------------------------------
Starts 5 4 100+ 150+ 150+
---------------------------------------------------------------------
#Employees/Home Building 5 1 0 5 5
---------------------------------------------------------------------
#Employees/Total Company 5 1 50 5 5
---------------------------------------------------------------------
Home Building Products
... rental X X
...single family X X X
... condominiums X X X X
... non-residential
------------------------------------------------------------------
Home Building Markets
...local X X
... state-wide X X X
... regional X
... national
... multinational
Access to Resources
...experience in H.B. x x x x
... capital x
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Summary Matrix 2
Company Description: 1987
1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th
firm firm firm firm firm
------------------------------------------------------------------
Age of firm 13 40 22 3 16
------------------------------------------------------------------
#Employees/Home Building 17 27 0 10 500
------------------------------------------------------------------
# Employees/Total Company 17 27 300 10 500
------------------------------------------------------------------
Volume
... starts a year 15-25 25-50 0 150 2000
...dollar sales volume 6 mil 14 mil 0 15 mil 99 mil
------------------------------------------------------------------
Home Building Products
... rental na x x
... single family x x na x
... condominiums x x na x x
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Home Building Markets
... local x x na
... state-wide na x x
... regional na x x
...national na x
... multinational x na
Resources Built Up
...experienced H.B. staff x na x x
...access to capital x x na x x
... reputation x x na x x
... controls na x x
...diversified x x na x
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Summary Matrix #3
Organization of the Firm and the Values of the Principles
1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th
firm firm firm firm firm
---------------- -------------------------------------------------
PARTNERSHIP
2 partners 3 partners
... type/partners family RE.prof
---------------- -------------------------------------------------
CORPORATION TYPE private, private,
held by held by
family RE.prof
sold to
public corp.
FOUNDERS
...background builder builder RE.prof RE.prof RE.prof
---------------- -------------------------------------------------
energy authentic quality quality luxury
... personal values efficient arch. luxury apartment mixed
housing detail housing and income
condos housing
---------------- -------------------------------------------------
... business goals
... social goals and
desired contribution
survive survive
as as
home home
builder builder
cash
flow
for
other
business
do
some
thing
very
well
grow
and
prosper
help make improve good build
first- civic environ- business nice low-
time contri- ment ethics income
buyer bution housing
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private,
held by
RE.prof
Summary Matrix #4
Decision Structure and Strategic Planning Process
1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th
firm firm firm firm firm
DECISION MAKERS
... dominant partner yes yes yes yes yes
... all partners yes
... formal executive committee yes yes
SUPPORT STAFF
... planners no no no no no
... consultants no no no no no
STRATEGIC PLANNING PROCESS
...written plan no no no no no
... clear/consistant verbal p no yes no yes yes
... strategic retreats no no no no yes
... financial projections no no yes yes yes
...business plan no no no yes yes
...market studies no no yes yes yes
... organizational plan yes yes no yes yes
...continoius discussion no yes no yes yes
... sporatic discussion yes no yes no no
PRIMARY BASIS OF DECISIONS
... strategic direction no yes no yes yes
... analytical materials no no no yes no
...soft information yes yes yes yes yes
...judgement yes yes yes yes yes
...probed market yes yes yes yes yes
...negotiations/principles no yes yes yes yes
...preferences yes yes yes yes yes
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Summary Matrix #5
Generic Strategy
1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th
firm firm firm firm firm
MARKETS
unique
... industry-wide product
unique
...focused x product x x x
...low (initially)
...differentiated x x x x x
BUYERS ATTRACTED BY
...low-cost (initial)
... quality product (current) x x x x
...arch style x x x x
...quality services x x x x
...other amenities x x x x x
HOW FOCUSED
...by buyer x x x
...by market x x x x x
...by product x x x
OTHER PRODUCTS
...same strategy x x
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Summary Matrix #6
What Firms Know About Their Competitors
1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th
firm firm firm firm firm
------------------------------------------------------------------
WHO WERE THE COMPETITORS
...known stable group x (gov't. project)
...change with every project x x x
... many new entries x x
THE FIRM KEPT TRACK OF
...some names x x x x x
... some current projects x x x x x
...some capabilities x x x x x
... some financial results x
...strategy, goals, vulnerability x
KIND OF DATA FIRM KEPT
...full profile
...market studies x x x
...other x x x x x
OVERCAPACITY MONITORED
... by market studies
and other knowledge x x x x x
... through choice of NE x x x x x
...by competitor x
ATTITUDE TO COMPETITION
... had very little competition x x
...beat competition x x x
...concerned x x
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Summary Matrix #7
Risk Profile
1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th
firm firm firm firm firm
------------------------------------------------------------------
CRITICAL FACTORS
... interest rate x x
... land cost x x x
... overcapacity x x
... flexibility x x
... govt action x x
... economy x
RISKS TAKEN
... market risk no yes yes yes yes
... financial risk some some some some some
... land banking seldom sometimes
... joint venture no no yes yes yes
PROFIT MARGINS
... margins sought 20% 20% 15-20% 20-30% 6-20%
... margins achieved profits achieved only too takes
were high achieved soon lower
squeezed 20s on last margins
project for
volume
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Summary Matrix 8
Vertical Integration Decisions
1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th
firm firm firm firm firm
------------------------------------------------------------------
VERTICALLY INTEGATED? yes yes yes no yes
------------------------------------------------------------------
HOW INTEGRATED?
...engineering X
...architecture X
... construction X x X X
...interior design x
...sales X X
...law
...land development x X
...2nd mortgages X X X
...banking x
...syndications x
---- -------------------------------------------------------------
COSTS AND BENEFITS OF DECISION
... economic benefit yes yes yes na yes
------------------------------------------------------------------
... strategic benefit yes yes yes na yes
---------------------------------------- 
!--------------------------
... incurred admin. costs no yes yes . na yes
------------------------------------------------------------------
...more costly than
market transaction no yes no na yes
------------------------------------------------------------------
... balance/benefit & cost good good good good good
------------------------------------------------------------------
DEGREE OF INTEGRATION early yes yes yes yes
CONSISTANT WITH STRATEGY consistancy
later
land dev.
was new
strategy
--------------------------------------------------------
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Summary Matrix #9
Initial Entry through Internal Development
1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th
firm firm firm firm firm
------------------------------------------------------------------
WHY WAS INDUSTRY TARGETED
... in disequilibrium x
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------
...new industry x x x
------------------------------------------------------------------
... firm had advantages x x x x
------------------------------------------------------------------
...had low entry cost x x x x
------------------------------------------------------------------
...helped other business x
------------------------------------------------------------------
... poor information in industry x x x
------------------------------------------------------------------
...market signals x
discouraging competitors
------------------------------------------------------------------
... retaliation expected x x x x x
------------------------------------------------------------------
COST OF ENTRY
...investment x x
------------------------------------------------------------------
...entry barriers no no no yes no
------------------------------------------------------------------
... extra cost from barriers no
------------------------------------------------------------------
... cost of retaliation no no no no no
------------------------------------------------------------------
... add over-supply by entry no no no no no
------------------------------------------------------------------
... helped other business na na hurt na yes
------------------------------------------------------------------
WAS ENTRY
PROFITABLE yes yes no yes yes
------------------------------------------------------------------
ENTRY STRATEGY
... quality product x x x x x
...market innovation x x x
...create niche x X
...opp. in disequilibrium x
--------------------------------------------------------
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Summary Matrix #10
Capacity Expansion*
5th
firm
------------------------------------------------------------------
How Cyclical was the Industry very
-------------------------------------------------------
Did firm have other realistic options yes
-------------------------------------------------------
Did the options require different vertical integration yes
-------------------------------------------------------
How did the firm estimate
... demand market study
-------------------------------------------------------
... input costs analysis
-------------------------------------------------------
How did Firm Estimate Capacity of Competitors market studies
-------------------------------------------------------
Were the Products Differentiated unique
-------------------------------------------------------
Did the Supply/Demand Balance in not looked
the Industry Change with at by firm
the Firm's Added Capacity
-------------------------------------------------------
Comments:
* While most of the firms grew, only one, FMK (the 5th firm), made a
conscious decision to grow. The decision reflected in this chart is the
decision made in 1981, to grow the government-assisted division by taking
on a 1400 unit project.
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Summary Matrix 11
Entry Through Acquisition*
2nd**
firm
------------------------------------------------------------------
Did Buyer have a Strategy Yes, to buy reputable, family
H.B. company in NE region
Was the Acquired Firm
... on the market no
... bought at value undervalued
Were there Market Imperfections yes
Did the Buyer Have Superior Information yes
Was the Econamy Bad no
Was the firm Sick no
How was the Value Set Reputation, Inventory, Results
Did Sellers Ask Full Value no
Did the Seller Have Personal Motives yes
Did The Company Make Subsequent Acquisitions yes
... same industry grouing yes
... same goals no
... same acquisition strategy no
Was the Acquisition Profitable yes
Comments:
* There was only one example in the cases of an acquisition decision.
Acquisition of home builders is not a very common occurance.
** Firm 2, Authentic Homes, was purchased by a British Multinational. The
acquisition was generally successful because the buyer benefited from the
fact that the seller had non-economic reasons to sell.
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Summary Matrix #12
Exit Decisions Considered by Companies*
1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th
firm firm firm firm firm
SIGNS OF DECLINE
decline in
..absolute decline/sales profits no no na yes
...more than cycle yes na no yes
... uncertainty about future yes no no yes
... increased rivalry yes no no yes
... cause of decline gov't na na gov't
action/ action
land cost
REMAINING POCKETS OF DEMAND
...price-incensative buyers no yes yes yes
...firm strong in pockets no yes yes yes
...firm needs to stay no no no no
... exit barriers strategic no no strategic
... easy to leave yes yes yes yes
slowly
STRATEGY CHOSEN diver- sold/ exit/ remained/
sifying remained absorbed invested/
to manage staff grew
REASON still retired- other preference
deciding cashed business reputation
out
Comments:
* Four of the five firms have considered exit decisions: two of the firms
because the industry was in absolute decline; one for reasons personal of
the decision maker; and one to tend to needs of the primary business.
Only one firm left the industry. Another was sold. Two remained.
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Summary Matrix 13
Summary of Strategy
SUCCESS MATRIX 1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th
firm firm firm firm firm
Was Firm Successful no yes no yes yes
Criteria for Success
...made profit margins squeezed yes seldom should yes
... still in business deciding yes no yes yes
...beat competition holds own yes holds own yes yes
...deliver quality product yes yes yes yes yes
...met business goals no, had yes no yes yes
to diversify
out of H.B.
Components of Strategy
...written strategic plan no no no no no
... clear and internally
generic strategy no yes no yes yes
... quality & attention
to detail yes yes yes yes yes
... entrepreneurial hustle yes yes yes yes yes
Strategy Chosen focused focused stuck-in- focused focused
middle
... price-policy cost-lead unique diff. diff. unique
... customers were
price-insenitive no yes no yes yes
... market local local state regional national
Strategy Problem lost stuck-in
low-end middle
market custom/volume
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Summary Marrix 13 - page 2
Summary of Strategy
1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th
firm firm firm firm firm
Were Other Strategic Decisions Consistent With Generic Strategy
... vertical integration yes & no yes yes yes yes
... capacity expansion na na na na yes
Analyze Competitors no no no yes no
Was There a
... dominant decision maker yes yes yes yes yes
... shared strategy yes yes no yes yes
Did the Strategy Reflect
...decision maker's exp. yes yes yes yes yes
...decision maker's values yes yes yes yes yes
Were Values Clarified
was strategy proactive no yes yes yes yes
... was strategy creative no yes no yes yes
... was product unique no yes no no yes
... experimentation built in no yes no yes yes
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Summary Matrix #13 - page 3
Symmary of Strategy
1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th
REALISTIC STRATEGIC PROCESS firm firm firm firm firm
Was Strategy formulated through
... Strategic planning
process no no no no no
... soft data yes yes yes yes yes
... analytical material no yes no yes yes
... knowledge/experience yes yes yes yes yes
... probing market yes yes yes yes yes
...identified opportunity yes yes yes yes yes
Basis of Decisions
...judgement yes yes yes yes yes
... and analysis no no no yes no
---------------------------------------------------------------------
Exercised Strategic Discip1 yes yes yes yes yes
---------------------------------------------------------------------
Strategy Reflected In
infrastructure yes yes no yes yes
... recruitment policy no yes no yes yes
--------------------------------------------------------------------
... anticipated risks no yes no yes yes
---------------------------------------------------------------------
Developed Financial Control no no yes yes yes
-------------------------------------------------------------
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